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Christopher Gilley

**A Simple Question of
'Pragmatism'?**

**Sovietophilism in the West Ukrainian
Emigration in the 1920s**

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About the author:

Christopher Gilley is a Research Associate of the Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies (KICES). He is currently completing a PhD on Sovietophilism in the Ukrainian emigration and the return of Ukrainian émigrés to the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s at Hamburg University. The project was made possible by funding provided by the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst – DAAD).

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<p>Koszalin Institute of Comparative European Studies ul. Zielona 13/1 PL-75-664 Koszalin Poland e-mail: info@kices.org internet: http://www.kices.org</p>

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Introduction

Western historians writing on the political thought of the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s have characterised the developments of this period as a 'turn to the right'. Before 1917 the Ukrainian intelligentsia living under the Romanov empire had advocated a dual national and social revolution and the realisation of Ukrainian national goals inside a federation with Russia. In eastern Galicia, Ukrainian political thought was shaped by the experience of parliamentarianism under the Habsburgs. The Ukrainian political parties in Austria-Hungary had cultural goals, such as the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv, and sought the division of Galicia so that Ukrainians had their own crown land. After 1920 it became a commonplace in the émigré community that class and party differences had condemned the attempt to create a Ukrainian state to failure and that such differences should be subordinated to the interests of the nation. A national executive should embody the will of the nation and lead an unrelenting struggle for an independent Ukrainian state. Many Galicians were prominent in the development of this form of 'integral nationalism', for example Ievhen Konovalts, who was instrumental in founding the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). However, in the 1920s some Ukrainian émigrés actually began to argue that it was necessary to come to terms with the Bolsheviks. This included some prominent members of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), including the historian and president of the Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the writer and Social Democrat Volodymyr Vynnychenko and the UNR foreign minister Andrii Nikovskyi. Among the Galicians who took up a Sovietophile position in the 1920s were Ievhen Petrushevych, the dictator of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, the leading Social Democrat Iuliian Bachynskyi and the intellectuals Mykahilo Lozynskyi and Antin Krushelnytskyi.

Until now, these groups have received little attention. Western historians have been more interested in the emergence of right-wing nationalism, as this laid the foundations for the collaboration between Ukrainian nationalists and the German National Socialists during the Second World War.¹ Since the proclamation of independence in 1991 Ukrainian historians have been more concerned with establishing a pantheon of national heroes who fought for the creation of a Ukrainian state than with studying a group which was prepared to collaborate with the 'national enemy'. Where they have dealt with the Sovietophiles, Ukrainian historians have adopted a number of tactics to dismiss or relativise the label of Sovietophilism. In some cases historians have used selective quotation to portray the views of past figures as being the exact opposite of those left behind in their written legacy.² Other historians have casually dismissed the pro-Soviet orientation as a 'tactical' or 'pragmatic' manoeuvre, by which they seem to mean a geopolitical orientation towards the Bolsheviks motivated not by ideological affinity but rather the

¹ See Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, New York, 1980; Frank Golczewski, 'Die Ukrainische Emigration', in Frank Golczewski (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen, 1993, pp.224–40 and the same author's 'Politische Konzepte des ukrainischen nicht sozialistischen Exils (Petljura-Lypynskyj-Donzow)' in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (eds.), *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden, 1993, pp.100–117.

² O.I. Saltovskyy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti v istorii vitchyznianoï politychnoi dumky*, Kyiv: Parpapan, 2002, p.289.

need for support against the Poles.³ For example, O. Pavliuk wrote that Petrushevych's Sovietophilism was a product of necessity and not conviction: he concluded that the east Galician leader's main motivation for coming to an understanding with the Bolsheviks was a forced response to the international situation and the policies of neighbouring powers.⁴ I. Benei argued that Bachynskiyi adopted a pro-Soviet stance out of 'pragmatic' considerations and makes an unfortunate comparison with the OUN: 'the leaders of OUN orientated for a certain time towards Germany, but this does not mean that they were Naziphile'.⁵

This working paper aims to rectify both of these flawed approaches to the subject of east Galician Sovietophilism. By providing a comprehensive presentation and analysis of the views and actions of the west Ukrainian Sovietophiles, it is possible to refute any claims based on selective quotation that these figures were actually opponents of the Bolsheviks. Further, this allows one to explore the distinction made by many Ukrainian historians between 'geopolitical' and 'ideological' motives behind the cooperation with the Bolsheviks. The eastern Galicians provide an especially useful case study from which to assess the validity of this division. Unlike those Ukrainians who lived in Russia, for whom the Russians were the main frustrators of their national goals, Ukrainians in eastern Galicia saw the Poles as the main impediment to the realisation of their national aspirations. The hostilities between Poland and the West Ukrainian People's Republic 1918–19 intensified the pre-war conflict between the Poles and Ukrainians in eastern Galicia, especially following the annexation of the province by the Polish Republic. Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine, which had themselves only recently emerged from a war with Poland, were natural allies for the east Galicians against the Poles. In this context a geopolitical, non-ideological orientation towards the Soviet Union was imaginable. However, it is also necessary to ascertain whether other motives were involved. For some, the creation of a Soviet Ukrainian Republic represented the granting of statehood to the Ukrainian nation. In 1923 a policy of Ukrainianisation was introduced in the Soviet Ukraine which sought to promote the use of the Ukrainian language in government and institutions of higher education and increase the number of Ukrainians working in the party and state apparatus. Others were undoubtedly attracted by the social program of the Bolsheviks and the promise of the dawning of a new socialist age. This paper therefore seeks to weigh up the interaction of geopolitical, national and socialist elements in the thought of the west Ukrainian Sovietophiles.

A study of the west Ukrainian Sovietophiles also offers a new perspective from which to examine the policy of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ukraine towards the west Ukrainian lands. One of the major elements of this has been dubbed by Terry Martin the 'Piedmont Principle': the belief that national developments in the Soviet Ukraine would cause Ukrainians living in Poland to look to the Soviet Ukrainian republic as the Ukraine's national centre; the Soviet Ukraine would therefore become the centre for the unification of the Ukrainian lands outside the Soviet Union. This provided the Soviet Union with an effective tool to undermine Poland's stability. As *Visti VUTsIK*, the main

³ In this way, they are echoing much of the Ukrainian literature on the collaboration between the Ukrainian far right and the Nazis. See Conclusion below.

⁴ O .V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha: Perekonannia chy Vymushenist', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.4, pp.95–102, 1997, (p.100).

⁵ Ihor Benei, *Iuliian Bachynskiyi. Sotsial-Demokrat i derzhavyk*, Kyiv: Osnovni Tsinnosti, 2001, p.53.

paper in the Soviet Ukraine, claimed: ‘There was a time when Galicia served as the “Piedmont” for Ukrainian culture. Now, when Ukrainian culture is suffocating in “cultured”, “European” Poland, its centre has naturally shifted to the Ukrainian SSR’.⁶ This principle of foreign policy came to be abandoned, however, when the Bolsheviks started to suspect that the attraction was working the wrong way: that those elements which had travelled to the Soviet Ukraine from outside were actually encouraging Ukrainians in the Soviet Union to turn their affections towards countries beyond its borders. In 1927 the Ukrainian Bolshevik Volodymyr Zatonskyi wrote that the western Ukraine was being turned into a ‘Piedmont to attract discontented elements within [Soviet] Ukraine’.⁷ By describing the Soviet Ukraine’s response to the western Ukrainians turning to it for help, it is possible to see how the Piedmont Principle was always inhibited by the suspicions of the representatives of the Soviet Ukraine towards those affected by the policy.

Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian Revolutions

On the eve of the First World War the territory which now makes up the independent Ukrainian state was divided between two empires. The largest part, with a population of about 29 million, was under the rule of the Romanov tsars. About 4 million Ukrainians lived under the rule of the Habsburgs in Austria-Hungary, where they were referred to as Ruthenians. In the Austrian half of the empire Ruthenians lived in eastern Galicia and Bukovina; in the Hungarian half there were Ruthenians in Transcarpathia. The largest Ruthenian community was in Galicia, where they made up about 42% of the population. Most of these lived in the eastern part of the crown land, where they formed a majority with at least 62%. The other major nationality was the Poles, who represented about 45% of the population, but were in a clear minority in the east of the province. Many Poles hoped to recreate the Polish Republic, whose historic borders included all of Galicia. Many Ukrainians on the other hand aimed to split Galicia into its Polish and Ukrainian halves and perhaps to unify the latter with those Ukrainian territories in Bukovina. The national aspirations of the two nationalities therefore conflicted. The Poles had the upper hand in that they dominated the entire province socially, politically and economically. The aristocracy of the region was entirely Polish. The Ruthenian nobility which had existed had long since been Polonified. Most Ruthenians were peasants. In 1912, 37.8% of east Galician land was in the hands of the Polish large landowners. The franchise was weighted towards the large landowners and therefore the Poles also dominated the Galician diet. From 1871 all the major posts in the government of Galicia were held by Poles. Polish support was essential for the government in Vienna to maintain order in the provinces. In 1867 the Habsburgs made considerable concessions to ensure Polish loyalty following the disastrous war of 1866 against Prussia. Polish became the language of internal administration, secondary schools and the University of Lviv.⁸

⁶ Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp.8–9. The quotation is on p.9.

⁷ Martin, *Affirmative Action*, pp.225–7. The quotation is on p.227.

⁸ Wolfdieter Bihl, ‘Die Ruthenen’, in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. Band III. Die Völker des Reiches. 1. Teil*, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980, pp.555–84 (pp.560–4); Paul Robert Magosci, *A History of Ukraine*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996, pp.417–29.

Despite these difficult conditions, national movements did develop among the Ruthenians. Over the nineteenth century three distinctive understandings of Ruthenian national identity emerged: the Old Ruthenian, which advocated a Ruthenian patriotism limited to the East Slavic lands within the Habsburg empire; the Ukrainophile, which gradually came to see the Ruthenians as part of a Ukrainian nation which included the 'Ukrainians' in the Russian empire; and the Russophile, which declared that the Ruthenians were a branch of the Russian nation. The social exclusivity of the Old Ruthenians prevented the movement from acquiring mass support. In contrast, from the 1860s the Ukrainophiles and Russophiles set up reading clubs and educational associations and started publishing newspapers and text books in order to disseminate their understanding of Ruthenian national consciousness among the peasants. By 1906 the *Prosvita* society, established by Ukrainophiles, was the most widespread with 1,700 reading rooms and 10,000 members. Another means of reaching the rural population was the creation of cooperatives and mutual credit associations, of which there were more than 500 by the eve of the First World War. Academic societies such as the Shevchenko Scientific Society promoted Ukrainian scholarship. The 1890s saw the emergence of Ukrainian political parties. The first Ukrainophile party was the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, founded by Mykhailo Pavlyk and Ivan Franko in 1890, which advocated agrarian socialism and anticlericalism. In 1899 a group of young intellectuals who wanted to take up a more Social-Democratic program, which included Mykola Hankevych, Semen Vityk and Iuliiian Bachynskyi, left the Radical Party. Together they founded the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDP), which adopted the program of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In the same year a number of more nationally minded Ukrainians led by Ievhen Levytskyi also left the Radicals to set up the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP). The new party brought together left-wing populists and members of the lower orders of the Greek-Catholic clergy and advocated the division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian crownlands. The UNDP became the most influential Ruthenian party in the province. A number of its representatives, for example Kost Levytskyi, Ievhen Petrushevych and Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, went on to play leading roles in the West Ukrainian People's Republic, established following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. The Russophiles, too, set up a party, the Russian National Party. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century support for the Russophiles was waning in favour of the Ukrainophiles. In the 1907 elections to the parliament in Vienna the various Ukrainophile parties won twenty-two seats in comparison to the Russophiles five.⁹

In contrast, an organised political life had not developed in the 'eastern Ukraine', that is those lands of the present-day Ukraine which were ruled by the Romanovs at the turn of the century. As among the Ruthenians of the Habsburg empire, there was a wide spectrum of views among the 'Ukrainian' intelligentsia on their identity. On one extreme there were those who saw themselves as an undifferentiated part of the Russian nation; then there were those who described 'Ukrainians' as 'Little Russians', who alongside the Great Russians and White Russians were one branch of the Russian nation. Further along the scale were Ukrainophiles who asserted the cultural distinctness of a Ukrainian nation from that of the Russians; nevertheless, many Ukrainophiles believed that there

⁹ John-Paul Himka 'The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in almost all Directions', in Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (eds.), *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, Ann Arbor, 1999, pp.109–164; Magosci, *Ukraine*, pp.436–52.

were links between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.¹⁰ The tsars were suspicious of any signs of ‘Little Russian separatism’ and therefore cracked down on attempts to assert the cultural individuality of a Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainophile intelligentsia did not have the opportunities to spread its understanding of Ukrainian identity in the way that their counterparts in eastern Galicia did. Consequently, Ukrainophilism remained confined to small intellectual circles. The tsarist autocracy also placed limits on the development of political parties. A number of semi-legal parties were formed after 1900, but only the outbreak of the 1905 revolution allowed them to act openly. One of the most important was the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which sought to combine socialism with the claim of Ukrainian cultural distinctiveness. Though the party was small, some of its members, above all Symon Petliura and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, went on to play central roles during the Ukrainian revolution. The reversal of the experiment with parliamentarianism in 1907 meant that Ukrainian political organisation suffered a stillbirth in the Russian Empire.¹¹ It was this discrepancy between development in the lands under Habsburgs and those under the Romanovs that led to the claim that Galicia was the Ukraine’s Piedmont, that the small province was the potential agent of Ukrainian national revival. The term was coined by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, himself from the east, but at that time professor of history in Lviv. This fact neatly illuminates the situation: though there were eastern Ukrainians who were central to the development of a Ukrainian national identity, they could most freely work in Galicia and it was here that their ideas were most readily taken up.

Nevertheless, it was not in eastern Galicia that a Ukrainian state was first established, but rather in Kyiv. Here the collapse of the ruling dynasty created a vacuum which allowed the expression of Ukrainian national demands, and which in itself radicalised these demands. Following the abdication of the tsar a Central Rada (council) was established in Kyiv to represent Ukrainian interests. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi became its president; the governing council of the Central Rada was headed by the acclaimed writer and Social Democrat Volodymyr Vynnychenko. At first, in keeping with the traditions of pre-war Ukrainophilism, the Central Rada followed the goals of political and cultural autonomy. However, following the October revolution conflict emerged between the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada over the latter’s claim to authority over the Ukrainian units of the Russian army and its recognition of the Don Cossack Republic. The Red Army invaded; in response the Central Rada declared the independence of a Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) and sought a separate peace with the Central Powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary were willing to send troops to help the Central Rada in exchange for raw materials. The German and Austro-Hungarian troops pushed the Bolsheviks out of Kyiv; however, disagreements soon arose between the Central Powers, which wanted to secure grain transports to their countries, and the Central Rada, which hoped to represent the interests of the peasants. A German-supported coup took place in April 1918 and Pavlo Skoropadskyi, a Little Russian noble and a former general in the tsar’s army, became the ruler of the Ukraine. This conservative puppet regime did not enjoy great support among the population because its policy of requisition angered many peasants. The Ukrainian national intelligentsia which opposed Skoropadskyi

¹⁰ Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question. The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Budapest: CEU Press, 2003, pp.49–58.

¹¹ Magosci, *Ukraine*, pp.377–82.

formed its own alternative government: the Directory headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, who was in charge of the Directory's military forces. The Directory started a rising in November. The German collapse on the Western Front soon removed the one prop which kept the Skoropadskyi regime from falling. In December the Germans abandoned Kyiv; the Directory entered the city and declared itself the government of a restored UNR. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had formed a Ukrainian branch of their party under the name the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U) in April 1918. In November it formed its own Ukrainian Soviet government with its capital in Kharkiv and in December war broke out between the Directory and the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. In February 1919 the KP(b)U took Kyiv and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Directory was split by disagreements between Vynnychenko and Petliura: the former wanted to turn the Directory into a form of soviet government; the latter wanted an alliance with the Entente in order to beat back the Bolsheviks. Petliura's power within the Directory rose and in February Vynnychenko was excluded from the government as one of the Western Powers' preconditions for their support.¹²

Thus, by the time the West Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed in November 1918, three Ukrainian states had already come into, and in one case faded out of, existence: the UNR of the Central Rada and the Directory, the Hetmanate under Skoropadskyi and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In order to understand the 'lateness' of the Ukraine's 'Piedmont' Galicia one must remember that it was only the collapse of the old regimes which allowed, or indeed necessitated, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. At the beginning of the First World War the Ukrainian parties in eastern Galicia had declared their loyalty to the Habsburg regime. However, the experience of the war hardened the position of the Galicians towards the Poles: when the Austrian parliament was reconvened the Ukrainian parliamentary club refused to countenance a future organisation of the empire in which the Galicians were ruled by the Poles. Some Ukrainian groups made preparations for a possible collapse of the Monarchy. In September, a Central Military Committee was organised in Lviv by Ukrainian officers in the Austro-Hungarian army to plan for a possible seizure of power. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian politicians sought the realisation of their national goals within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy right to the end. The east Galician Ukrainians responded to Emperor Karl's manifesto proposing the reorganisation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy along federal lines by setting up the Ukrainian National Council with Ievhen Petrushevych, a Ukrainian National Democrat and leader of the Ukrainian delegation in the Viennese parliament, at its head. The Ukrainian National Council pronounced the existence of a Ukrainian state of all the Ukrainian lands within Austria-Hungary, but it did not secede from Austria-Hungary, thereby leaving the possibility of remaining within a Habsburg-led federation open. Only on 1st November did the Ukrainian National Council proclaim the independence of the Ukrainian state and assume power in Lviv, the capital of the new country, with the help of Ukrainian units of the Austro-Hungarian army. On 13th the state was christened the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) with the head of the National Council Petrushevych as its leader.¹³

¹² See Taras Hunczak (ed.), *The Ukraine 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.

¹³ Magosci, *Ukraine*, pp.512–4.

Ievhen Petrushevych and the Government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic

The history of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) between 1918 and 1923 has been investigated comprehensively by Torsten Wehrhahn.¹⁴ It is therefore unnecessary to go into all the details of Petrushevych's policy during these years. Instead, this section will concentrate on the process by which Petrushevych came to adopt a pro-Soviet position. Though this account draws on Wehrhahn's work, it also adds to it by using the correspondence and reports of the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries abroad. Another useful secondary source for the ZUNR's policy before the March Decision is provided by two articles by O. Pavliuk, which specifically look at the question of Petrushevych's Sovietophilism.¹⁵ Pavliuk uses the ZUNR documents preserved in the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, to which Wehrhahn did not have access. There has been very little research on Petrushevych after 1923. At the time of writing, the Petrushevych archive in the *Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obednan* (the former party archive in Kyiv) was still in preparation. Before these documents are available, it is impossible to look at Petrushevych's Sovietophile period in greater detail. This account will therefore only briefly present the Central Committee decisions and plenipotentiary reports concerning the later activities of the ZUNR leader.

The decisive reason for Petrushevych's turning to the Soviet government was the war which broke out between the east Galician Ukrainians and the Poles. In Lviv this flared up on the very day on which the independence of the province was proclaimed. By 21st November the Ukrainians had been forced from the city which had been declared their capital. The government of the new state was moved to Ternopol and then in January to Stanyslaviv. Unlike the Poles, whose independence had been one of the Entente's war aims since early 1918, the Ukrainians lacked international support. One possible ally, both from strategic and national-ideological grounds, was the newly created Ukrainian state in the east. From the end of 1918 plans were made for the unification of the two newly created Ukrainian republics and in January the ZUNR and the UNR announced their amalgamation. Despite the rhetoric of the creation of a unified Ukrainian state, the ZUNR government continued to act as an independent entity with its own armed force, the Galician Ukrainian Army (UHA). Moreover, the UNR was unable to provide much support against the Poles and on the whole the ZUNR had to rely on its own resources. At the beginning of 1919 the UHA succeeded in pushing back the Poles. At the same time the Western powers sought to mediate a peace between the warring sides in the province. However, by March the west Ukrainian offensive had failed and it was clear that the peace discussions had come to nothing.¹⁶

These failures caused the ZUNR to question their relationship to the UNR and the Bolsheviks. On 11th March Petrushevych had rejected the idea of opening negotiations with the Bolsheviks in favour of seeking new talks with the French command. However, the creation of a Soviet republic in Hungary put the question back on the agenda. On 31st

¹⁴ Torsten Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik. Zu den polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen und dem Problem der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit in den Jahren 1918 bis 1923*, Berlin: Weißensee, 2004.

¹⁵ O.V. Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha: perekonannya chy vymushenist?', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.3, pp.109–18 and No.4, pp.95–102.

¹⁶ See Magocsi, *Ukraine*, pp.513–6 and Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, p.127f.

March, the leaders of the ZUNR discussed a report from Budapest which stated that Bela Kun had offered to act as an intermediary in negotiations between the ZUNR and the Soviet government. The leaders of the West Ukrainian Republic rejected the proposal. Petrushevych's view that talks with the Bolsheviks would wreck the discussions with the Entente was accepted. His supporters in this matter felt that to accept this approach would be an act of disloyalty towards the head of the UNR Petliura. However, there were those who argued in favour of taking up the Hungarian suggestion. Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, the foreign minister of the ZUNR, saw discussion with the Bolsheviks as possible if they recognised Ukrainian sovereignty and drew a line of demarcation which the Red Army would not cross. Mykhailo Lozynskyi, the deputy foreign minister, also believed private talks could be conducted through Hungary. On 7th May the question again came up when the Ukrainian Soviet leader Khristiian Rakovskii wrote to the ZUNR suggesting an end to their conflict and declaring that the future of eastern Galicia should be determined by the workers and peasants living in it. Three days later this was discussed in a joint sitting of the two Ukrainian governments. Borys Martos, the UNR premier and finance minister who represented the Directory at the meeting, counselled against an armistice with the Bolsheviks because this would make activity at the Paris peace conference impossible. Tsehelskyi, on the other hand, felt that the front against the Bolsheviks was the only one which could be removed because the Poles would never agree to such talks. He was therefore in favour of negotiations with the Bolsheviks, even though this was reprehensible from the all-Ukrainian perspective. On 13th May, however, Petliura declared that the east Galician units should move against the Bolsheviks. In response to the objections that a two-front war was impossible, he strengthened this into a direct order.¹⁷

This indeed proved to be the case. In April the 100,000-strong army led by Józef Haller had arrived in Poland. It had been equipped by the Entente in order to fight against the Red Army, but instead of joining the front with Soviet Russia it was sent to eastern Galicia. The Poles pushed back the ZUNR. During this conflict the Ukrainian National Council proclaimed Petrushevych dictator, investing him with total legislative and executive power. The Poles' success meant that by the end of May and beginning of June the western Ukrainians could not hope to come to an agreement with the Poles, as they had nothing to offer in negotiations. However, the government of the UNR saw a cease-fire with the Poles as a way of preparing their own campaign against the Bolsheviks. They entered into talks with the Poles at the beginning of July, which further strained relations with the ZUNR. In response to their difficult position, the western Ukrainians sent a delegation to the leadership of the Soviet 12th Army. Talks took place in Berdychev. The Soviet negotiators were conscious of their position of strength and demanded that the west Ukrainian government break with Petliura and declare that they supported the Bolsheviks. The eastern Galicians should join an alliance against Poland and Rumania. The UHA would be placed under a unified command and Kyivan commissars would join the east Galician army. Petliura's troops in eastern Galicia would be disarmed. Although the Bolsheviks promised not to interfere in internal east Galician matters, this guarantee was probably only a sweetener for the otherwise bitter conditions. Petrushevych rejected the terms, possibly in the hope that the Entente still might preserve east Galician independence. However, he continued to waver between a pro-

¹⁷ Wehrhahn, *Westukranische Volksrepublik*, pp.228, 230–1.

Bolshevik course and cooperation with the UNR. Only on 15th July did Petrushevych promise Petliura that he would fight against the Bolsheviks. Three days later the ZUNR government and the remnants of its army crossed the border into the Ukrainian People's Republic. They moved to Kamianets-Podilskyi, where the UNR had its seat of government.¹⁸

The relationship between the two Ukrainian governments continued to worsen. Though the two Ukrainian states had formally unified, the ZUNR sought to maintain its independence. Petrushevych understood the creation of a UNR ministry for west Ukrainian affairs as an incursion on his authority. There were also arguments over whether the UHA should be placed under the UNR command. However, more fundamental differences existed. The political worldview of the ZUNR was shaped by Habsburg parliamentarianism, whereas the members of the UNR government had a socialist background. Similarly, as a consequence of their different experiences under the Habsburgs and Romanovs, the ZUNR and UNR had different geopolitical conceptions: whereas the eastern Ukrainians saw the Russians as the main adversary to Ukrainian statehood, the Galicians believed the Poles occupied this role; consequently, the UNR viewed the Polish Republic as a potential ally in the war against the Bolsheviks and the ZUNR hoped to fight the Poles with Russian help.¹⁹

The emergence of this geopolitical orientation towards Russia was the first step towards the Sovietophilism of Petrushevych and the ZUNR. In August 1919, for example, Kost Levytskyi, the head of the state secretariat of the ZUNR, argued in favour of an alliance with Denikin and the creation of a federation with Russia. Levytskyi admitted that the east Galician Ukrainians had been enemies of Russophilism, but he saw this solution as the best means of combating Polish and Rumanian designs on the west Ukrainian lands. The ZUNR representative in Paris Vasyl Paneiko sought contacts with Russian circles in the French capital. Indeed, in November 1919 the high command of the east Galician army, without Petrushevych's knowledge, signed a ceasefire with Denikin and placed the UHA under his command. At a joint meeting with the UNR government, Petrushevych later defended an alliance with the Russian general not because he believed Denikin could overcome the Bolsheviks; on the contrary, he was convinced that the Volunteer Army would be defeated. Instead, he argued that by allying with the White movement the Ukrainians would be able to maintain the integrity of their army with the help of the Entente. Following the Bolsheviks' likely victory, the Ukrainians could then fight for their statehood. He ruled out an alliance with the Bolsheviks because this would irreparably harm the Ukraine's relationship with the Entente. The UNR representatives, however, seeing Denikin as the proponent of a 'one and indivisible Russia', condemned the Galicians' course. This meeting showed that the two Ukrainian governments could not work together. In the night of 15th/16th November, Petrushevych once more emigrated, this time making his way to Vienna. The split between the ZUNR and UNR enabled the east Ukrainian government to come to an agreement with Poland. In December, in a joint declaration the UNR gave up eastern Galicia to Poland. Thus, following the defeat of Denikin the UHA did not rejoin the UNR troops, but rather defected to the Bolsheviks.²⁰

¹⁸ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.233–4.

¹⁹ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.235–7.

²⁰ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.236, 238–9, 241–2.

Following the emigration of the ZUNR government to Vienna, the awareness that a geopolitical orientation towards Russia might necessitate an understanding with the Bolsheviks began to grow. In an article in the ZUNR organ *Ukrainskyi Prapor* from January 1920, Lonhyn Tsehelskyi argued that eastern Galicia could either turn to the West or to the East: the first option meant an alliance with the Poles; the second alternative could be achieved through a pact either with the Soviet republics or with the Russian Whites. Tsehelskyi ruled out an agreement with the Poles because their imperialist and reactionary mentality prevented a positive policy towards the Ukrainians. He felt that the second option had deeper roots in the Ukrainian people and was more promising. He praised Vynnychenko, who he believed had followed the Eastern orientation towards the Bolsheviks or Denikin.²¹ In looking for an ally against the Poles, Kost Levytskyi had first suggested anti-Bolshevik Russia; following the White defeats in the civil war, Tsehelskyi had acknowledged that the Bolsheviks could also take on this role no less so than their enemies. Thus the pro-Bolshevik stance originated in an orientation towards Russia, whichever government ruled the country. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Tsehelskyi did not present working with the Bolsheviks and the Whites as alternatives, but rather as aspects of the same course. Indeed, he fully misunderstood Vynnychenko's views, falsely ascribing to Vynnychenko geopolitical motivations and a willingness to work with Denikin.

Though this direction was clearly under discussion in ruling ZUNR circles, the west Ukrainian government continued to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on the Western powers. In April 1920 the Poles invaded the Soviet Ukraine with the help of the UNR under Petliura. Though some members of the exile ZUNR government argued in favour of coming to an agreement with the Poles, the east Galician leadership agreed to continue the anti-Polish course. Petrushevych was convinced that the British and French would not place eastern Galicia under Polish rule. Representatives were sent to London, Paris and other Western capitals in order to lobby the Entente for support for the creation of a west Ukrainian state.²²

Despite this orientation towards the West, Petrushevych also began to look for alternative sources of support. Osyup Nazaruk, a member of the Ukrainian Radical Party and one of Petrushevych's closest advisors at this time, was instructed to travel to Copenhagen in order to meet the Soviet Russian ambassador there, Maksim Litvinov. In June, before Nazaruk left, a meeting took place at which Lev Petrushevych, the dictator's son, suggested forming an alliance with the Bolsheviks. He argued that they should stress east Galicia's geographical importance to Russia as a stepping stone to the West. He was against the forceful incorporation of the province into the Soviet system. He stressed that east Galicia had evolved in such a way that now it represented a nation in its own right, formed by the peasants and an intelligentsia which originated in the peasantry. Consequently, an independent east Galician State would not have a bourgeois character, but would rather be founded on the basis of the peasant class. Accordingly,

²¹ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp. 271–2. In June 1920 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who had been forced into emigration following a split with Petliura, arrived in Moscow with the hope of coming to terms with the Bolsheviks. He did so in the belief that it was necessary to form a common socialist front against counterrevolution; Vynnychenko therefore at no point considered an orientation towards Denikin – his orientation was ideological, not geopolitical.

²² Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.272–3, 276–7.

laws expropriating land from the large landowners and nationalising the forests would be introduced. Lev Petrushevych argued that in return for granting the province its independence, the east Galicians should offer to create a legion to fight against the Poles. This formula represented his maximum demands. The minimum requirement was east Galician autonomy within the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The province should not enjoy less independence than it had possessed under the Habsburgs. The areas of transport and finance would be jointly run by east Galicia and the Soviet Ukraine. An east Galician unit would be formed within the Red Army to protect the province against the Poles. Laws would be introduced nationalising large industry and redistributing land among the peasants; however, the right of peasants to possess their own land would be protected. Nazaruk himself does not seem to have been enthusiastic about these plans. He recorded them in his notebook under the heading 'fantasies'. Nevertheless when he travelled to the Danish capital in July he asked Litvinov to make a declaration about the independence of eastern Galicia. This, however, was more than the Russian diplomat was prepared to do. The moment for open ZUNR-Bolshevik cooperation had not yet come. Petrushevych remained confident that the Entente would make a decision favourable to the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia. The Sovietophile course was being followed secretly for fear of harming the ZUNR government's standing with the Western powers. Moreover, east Galicia's bargaining power with the Bolsheviks had been undermined by the defection of the east Galician units in the Red Army to Petliura in April 1920.²³

Over the summer the joint Polish-UNR offensive came to a standstill. Piłsudski's armies were forced out of Kyiv and the Red Army began to march on Galicia. The Bolsheviks' entry into the province forced the east Galician exiles to reassess their relationship to the Soviet republics. In July and August 1920 *Ukrainskyi prapor* began to adopt an increasingly pro-Soviet position. In particular, the editor of the paper, Pavlo Lysiak, argued that the east Galician Ukrainians should cooperate with the Red Army marching into the province. Their interests lay in the East, as only the East could help the Ukrainians overcome the Poles' dominant position in Galicia. Ukrainians should welcome a Soviet regime in the province, he argued, as the Bolsheviks would attack the large land owners and industrial capitalists, who were primarily Poles and Jews. In another article, the ZUNR organ described the Red Army's advance into the province as a destruction of the French conception of a Greater Poland. It presented the creation of an east Galician state by the Bolsheviks as being no less desirable than a decision by the Entente which took into account the desires of the local population. *Ukrainskyi prapor* claimed that the interests of the Bolsheviks and of the Ukrainians in eastern Galicia coincided as the Soviet military successes restored east Galician statehood.²⁴

These hopes were not realised, however, for the Poles were able to beat back the Soviet advance. In September peace negotiations between the Poles and the Soviet republics began in Riga. Petrushevych sent an east Galician delegation to observe the conference. It should not actually take part because this could be understood as evidence that the ZUNR recognised the conference's authority to make a decision in the east Galician question. However, the delegation was instructed to establish contacts to the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations. Though there were two meetings with the Soviet representatives, the Soviet side saw these merely as a means of putting pressure on the

²³ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.279–80.

²⁴ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.281–2.

Poles. They had no intention of endangering the peace agreement by supporting the east Galician desire for national self-determination. The ZUNR delegation at Riga were powerless observers. In October an armistice was proclaimed and in March 1921 a peace treaty was signed by which the Soviet republics recognised the Polish occupation of eastern Galicia.²⁵

Following the armistice in October, the ZUNR government again returned the emphasis of its politics towards the search for support from the powers of the Entente. ZUNR representatives in the major Western capitals undertook extensive work lobbying the powers of the Entente for a decision in their favour.²⁶ However, at Riga the Bolsheviks had said in private that they would continue to support the independence of eastern Galicia. On this basis it was possible to continue seeking Soviet support.²⁷ In October 1921 one of Petrushevych's agents, Aleksei Fral visited Mykhailo Levytskyi. Fral tried to convince the head of the Soviet trade mission that there were a number of governments who supported east Galician independence. Fral therefore wanted to find out the Soviet position on this matter because, according to M. Levytskyi, Petrushevych feared the attachment of eastern Galicia to the Soviet Ukraine and the province's Sovietisation. M. Levytskyi replied that civil war in Galicia was not in the interests of the Soviet republics and they had no intention of breaking the Treaty of Riga. M. Levytskyi also wrote that he would not allow any official talks to take place with Petrushevych's representative in Prague Ievhen Levytskyi. He asked Rakovskii for his opinion on the matter.²⁸ Relations between the ZUNR and the Soviet authorities after the Treaty of Riga seem to have begun very coolly.

Despite the public orientation towards the Entente, during 1922 representatives of the ZUNR government continued to approach the Soviet Ukrainian foreign representatives with requests for help. On 6th March 1922 M. Levytskyi reported that Ievhen Levytskyi had asked him for help in allowing Petrushevych's government to take part in the upcoming Genoa conference. The Soviet plenipotentiary gave a cautious response, stressing his government's desire to retain its ability to act freely.²⁹ In Berlin, too, Petrushevych's representative Ia. Biberovych sought to find out what position the Soviet government would take at the coming conference. He met regularly with the head of trade mission in Berlin Volodymyr Aussem. Aussem promised him that the Soviet Ukrainian government would maintain the position privately declared at Riga and would support the east Galician matter at Genoa. Biberovych had hoped to meet Rakovskii, who had to travel through Berlin on his way to Genoa. However, the Soviet Ukrainian leader refused.³⁰ Petrushevych himself travelled to Genoa at the head of an unofficial ZUNR delegation. At the conference he was able to meet Rakovskii. Petrushevych wanted to send representatives to Moscow or Kharkiv and to receive financial support (five million German marks), arms, the creation of a military base beyond the Zbruch and Soviet

²⁵ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.283–4; Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.3, pp.114–5.

²⁶ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, pp.294–302.

²⁷ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.3, p.115.

²⁸ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark. 70–1.

²⁹ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.10.

³⁰ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.95.

support for a Galician legion.³¹ Though we do not have any evidence of Rakovskii's response, from the later actions of the ZUNR agents it would seem that they at least believed that Rakovskii had agreed to the establishment of ZUNR representatives in one of the Soviet capitals and funding. Following the conference, Biberovych tried to follow up this success by getting Aussem to commit himself to the promises the ZUNR believed had been made at Genoa. According to Biberovych, at two meetings in the middle of June Aussem promised to provide support for Petrushevych. He said he would provide the ZUNR with information about the coming Hague conference. In principle he agreed to grant material help to the ZUNR, but admitted that the details would have to be worked out in Kharkiv. He also asked the Galician government to name the agents who it wanted to send to Kharkiv. He did not envisage any difficulties in accepting them into the Ukraine.³²

Despite these promising signs, as summer drew on Petrushevych's circle began to feel that the Soviet governments were no longer interested in supporting them. In July 1922 Biberovych received instructions to arrange a meeting with the Russian ambassador in London. However, he also heard that the Russian foreign minister Chicherin, who was at that time in the German capital, was against such a meeting: any contacts with the ZUNR should be through the Ukrainian mission in Berlin. Moreover, Chicherin had not provided any new information about the ZUNR's requests to the Soviet governments. These facts disquieted Kost Levytskyi, who was now in charge of the west Ukrainian government's foreign affairs; he felt that Soviet policy had undergone a change which was disadvantageous for the ZUNR. He instructed Biberovych to approach the Soviet Ukraine's representatives to find out where they stood.³³ This alteration in policy coincided with a change in personnel in the Berlin mission. In July Aussem had a heart attack and Biberovych's new partners in the negotiations were less amenable to the ZUNR proposals. When Biberovych talked to Naum Kaliuzhnyi, Aussem's deputy, the Soviet diplomat refused to tie down the Soviet government to a concrete position. Unlike Aussem, he was against using Petrushevych as he questioned the ZUNR dictator's importance; Kaliuzhnyi argued that Ievhen Konovalts, the leader of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO), was more useful. Moreover, according to Kaliuzhnyi, in eastern Galicia itself there was a genuinely revolutionary mass which unarguably sympathised with the Soviet Ukraine.³⁴ Biberovych's accounts of the meeting with Kaliuzhnyi were more positive: the ZUNR agent claimed that Kaliuzhnyi supported the plan of sending agents to Kharkiv.³⁵

Aussem's replacement, M. Levytskyi, was no more compliant than Kaliuzhnyi. Biberovych met M. Levytskyi on 16th August to find out the Soviet decision on sending their representative to Moscow. Five days before the ZUNR agent had received a note from Kost Levytskyi naming the three members of the proposed ZUNR delegation to Kharkiv. The question of funding was also brought up again and Biberovych voiced his concerns provoked by rumours of a rapprochement between Poland and the Soviet regime. Levytskyi responded by suggesting that Rakovskii's intentions had been misunderstood:

³¹ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.96.

³² Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.96.

³³ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, pp.96-7.

³⁴ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.11.

³⁵ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.97.

he had not proposed that the ZUNR maintain a permanent representative in the Russian capital, but rather that someone be sent to discuss concrete questions; similarly material help would only be granted if Petrushevych undertook tangible action. He did reassure Biberovych, however, that the Soviet republics would never in spirit recognise the Polish occupation of eastern Galicia and that the ZUNR would receive a reply on the matter of the representatives by 25th or 26th August. Following the meeting Biberovych wrote that there were foundations for the Galician doubts about the Soviets. This indeed was the case: in his report to Kharkiv M. Levytskyi warned his superiors against sending such a representative to Moscow, as it would help Petliurist counterrevolution and harm Soviet relations with Poland. He argued that it was possible to grant support for the ZUNR without establishing a permanent representative in Kharkiv or Moscow. Levytskyi also complained that the ZUNR was trying to work directly with the Russian republic. This should not be allowed, he wrote; they should only deal with the Ukrainian government. He interpreted it as an attempt by the ZUNR to underline that the Ukraine did not exist as a state. For this reason he advocated caution when dealing with Petrushevych.³⁶ Clearly, no decision was made by the date promised by M. Levytskyi. At the end of August M. Levytskyi wrote again to Kharkiv. He asked for a decision on Petrushevych, because the dictator's representatives were visiting him daily, asking about financial support and the dispatch of a representative to Moscow. Nevertheless, M. Levytskyi was not against using the east Galician question surreptitiously. In August he sent an unsigned letter to the German press which stated that the recognition at Riga of the Polish occupation of eastern Galicia was merely an acknowledgement of the status quo; the Soviet republics still supported the independence of the Ukrainian province on the basis of the principle of national self-determination.³⁷ It seems that though M. Levytskyi was worried about the consequences of *open* support for Petrushevych, he was keen to use the east Galician question to undermine Poland.

While the negotiations in Berlin were continuing, Petrushevych sent his agent in Prague Fral to talk to the Russian representative P. Mostovenko. Petrushevych was worried by rumours of an understanding between Poland and Russia. The Russian diplomat assured him that Russia had not given up its desire to overcome the barrier on its western border. However at the moment, due to internal considerations, it could not do anything and did not want to establish official relations with the ZUNR. He therefore advised that Petrushevych should not insist on sending his agents to Moscow as official representatives; neither should the Galicians make the opening of talks on military help for the ZUNR a prerequisite to sending their agents to the Russian capital as this could be discussed after they arrived. The Russian diplomat told Fral that the ZUNR should conduct their relations with the Soviet Union through M. Levytskyi, but that if there was a situation for which the Ukrainian plenipotentiary lacked the necessary authority or influence, they should turn directly to Moscow. When Fral suggested that Rakovskii might not be pleased that the ZUNR was circumventing his government, Mostovenko replied that he would make sure there were no misunderstandings in this matter.³⁸ Thus despite his claim that M. Levytskyi was the main contact for this matter, Mostovenko seems to ha-

³⁶ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.12. The meeting is described from the point of view of Biberovych in Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, pp.97–8.

³⁷ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.13.

³⁸ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.98.

ve given Petrushevych ample leeway to try to play the Russian government off against the Ukrainian. This, of course, had been one of the fears expressed by M. Levytskyi in this report from the end of August.

In autumn 1922 the personnel of the Ukrainian missions once again changed. Aussem returned to his post in Berlin, while Kaliuzhnyi moved to Vienna. Biberovych continued to meet Aussem and Fral established contact to the Russian representative in Berlin M. Litvin.³⁹ In the middle of October Aussem wrote to Kharkiv complaining that a decision had not yet been made on aiding Petrushevych. He argued that the dictator enjoyed support among the population of eastern Galicia, as could be seen at a meeting of the Ukrainian National Democrats in August at which the party reiterated that Petrushevych was their leader. In contrast, according to Aussem, support for Ievhen Konovalts was fading. The ZUNR leader was encouraging a growth in pro-Soviet sentiment in the province and the terrorist campaign against the Poles was turning into a genuinely popular movement. Aussem warned that if the popular hope of help from the Soviet republics were disappointed, Petrushevych and the pro-Soviet platform would be compromised.⁴⁰ Against this, at the beginning of 1923 Kaliuzhnyi continued to argue that Petrushevych's influence in the Ukraine was waning. He believed that Petrushevych was following the Galician peasants and workers, who were attracted by Soviet slogans, rather than leading them. In this way, he was an opportunist, trying to use the strength and authority of the Soviet Union for his own ends. Kaliuzhnyi was therefore against entering into talks with Petrushevych.⁴¹ In December 1922 a decision was finally made allowing the ZUNR government to send its delegates. On 4th January 1923 Petrushevych signed a mandate naming E. Breiter and I. Kossak as his representatives to Moscow and Kharkiv. They were instructed to present the ZUNR's aim of achieving east Galician independence and to work out a common position with the Soviet governments. The two envoys set off for the Soviet republics immediately. On 7th March K. Levytskyi told Biberovych that the discussions with the Soviets were proceeding well.⁴²

The defining event in the relationship between the ZUNR and the Soviet government came, however, later in the year. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors, made up of representatives from the Entente, recognised Poland's annexation of eastern Galicia. The decision had a profound effect on Petrushevych's policy by ending his hopes that the Entente would create a West Ukrainian state. In May Ievhen Levytskyi informed M. Levytskyi that 'their orientation was now exclusively towards the Soviet Ukraine'. Ie. Levytskyi assured the Soviet representative that at the coming meeting of the Galician parties, Petrushevych would argue for the adoption of a Sovietophile stance. He also hoped to receive Soviet funding to start the evacuation of Galician internees to the Soviet Ukraine.⁴³ Following the decision, Petrushevych moved his government to Berlin, where he established contacts with the Soviet Russian plenipotentiary there, Nikolai Krestinskii. Indeed, Petrushevych is said to have promised the Soviet representative, in negotiations in Copenhagen, that in return for support for the Bolsheviks he would remove Konovalts as the supreme commander of the Ukrainian Military Or-

³⁹ Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.98.

⁴⁰ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.20-3, 25.

⁴¹ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1735 ark.13zv-14.

⁴² Pavliuk, 'Radianofilstvo Ie. Petrushevycha', 1997, No.4, p.99.

⁴³ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.87 ark.88.

ganisation (UVO) and place it at the Soviets' disposal.⁴⁴ At the beginning of November a conference took place in Vienna organised by émigré members of the Ukrainian National Labour Party (UNTP), the successor to the UNDP led by Petrushevych. The conference was also attended by members of the Galician Radical and Social-Democratic parties. The conference asserted that it was impossible to fight against both the Poles and the Bolsheviks and that the eastern front should therefore be liquidated. Both revolutionary and parliamentary means should be used to achieve the unification of the western Ukrainian lands with the eastern Ukraine.⁴⁵

Similarly, the Soviet Ukrainian government became more interested in gaining influence among the Galician emigration and in the province itself. In May 1923 Shumskyi prepared a document entitled 'The Theses of our Politics towards the Ukrainian Regions occupied by Poland and Rumania'. He noted the nationalist movement was experiencing a pronounced attraction 'towards the Soviet Ukraine as the only saviour from the szlachta-boyar yoke after the final collapse of the illusory hope on the League of Nations'. The Soviet Ukrainian government should therefore refuse to recognise the occupation of these territories and support the national movements within them in order to destabilise the Polish and Rumanian states. It should support the creation of a Galician-Volhynian state, which would belong to the Soviet sphere of influence. He also suggested granting Ukrainians from these areas the right of asylum on Soviet territory and, having taken the necessary precautions, build émigré centres there.⁴⁶ The western Ukraine and the émigrés from this area became increasingly the main object of Soviet Ukrainian foreign policy. On 21st August 1925 the Politburo resolved that 'the basic work of the Ukrainian Soviet [representatives] abroad is work among the emigration from the west Ukrainian lands in the direction of the creation of an irredenta in those lands'.⁴⁷

The March Decision undoubtedly created more favourable conditions in which the Soviet Ukrainian government could exploit anti-Polish feeling among Ukrainians in eastern Galicia and the east Galician emigration. However, this did not create an immediate change in its policy towards Petrushevych. The Soviet government continued to treat the ZUNR leader with caution. For example, on 23rd December 1923, the Politburo gave a negative answer to Aussem's inquiry about the possibility of accepting six former members of the Petrushevych government into the Ukraine for work there.⁴⁸ The question of funding Petrushevych was discussed on 7th December 1924. The Ukrainian Politburo resolved 'to reject the proposition by Konovalts and others (the Petrushevych group) about their receiving a subsidy, but with the aim of their further dissolution to draw on talks in different directions, to propose to them to give detailed information about what they have'.⁴⁹ It would seem that the Politburo saw the talks less as a means of establishing links with the émigré groups and more as a ruse to weaken them.

⁴⁴ Motyl, *Turn*, pp.35–6, 119–20.

⁴⁵ Vasiuta, I. K., 'Natstionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh u Zakhidnii Ukraini (1919–1939 rr.)', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2001, No.6, pp.35–66 (pp.42–3).

⁴⁶ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.47–8. The quotation is on ark.47.

⁴⁷ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.221.

⁴⁸ TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.165.

⁴⁹ A.V. Kentii, *Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiia (UVO) v 1920–1928 rr. Korotkyi narys*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1998, p.45; TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.40.

Despite this, the talks ended positively for Petrushevych. On 4th September 1925 the Politburo resolved that it was expedient to offer Petrushevych temporary support. He should provide a statement of his position on Soviet power and explain his relationship to the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), the conservative, moderately nationalist party which dominated Ukrainian politics in eastern Galicia between the wars.⁵⁰ The KP(b)U continued to support and direct Petrushevych for at least the rest of the decade. In a report form 31st May 1927 the Soviet Ukrainian consul in Lviv Iurii Kotsiubynskyi described a meeting with Petrushevych in Vienna. The Soviet representative described him as having only a few supporters, 'but it is an unsullied group, and his orientation towards the East is receiving a response among the peasantry'. Indeed, Kotsiubynskyi seemed more convinced of Petrushevych's political importance than did the dictator himself: he reported that Petrushevych was not confident of his own strength and as a result wanted to form a bloc with the Communist front organisation Selrob, while at the same time hoped to compete with them on the national question, given the Russophile leanings of the organisation. Kotsiubynskyi strictly forbade any such competition and advised that Petrushevych develop good relations with the organisation. He also promised to help Petrushevych publish his newspaper daily; up till that point it had only come out twice a week. Kotsiubynskyi was less impressed by Petrushevych's underground military organisation, which at that time was Petrushevych's main interest: it consisted only of the local intelligentsia and its members were young and inactive. Nevertheless, he wrote that the dictator was now very much oriented to the left and concluded that 'Petrushevych is now very valuable as a person who has strongly bound his fate with us'.⁵¹ Interestingly, whereas before the question of whether Petrushevych should receive funding had hinged on his usefulness, now just as important was his loyalty to the Soviet regime. For the next few years, the Ukrainian Soviet government must have remained pleased with Petrushevych's work. In 1929/30 he received 1,200 dollars, one of the larger sums granted by the Politburo to Ukrainian organisations abroad.⁵² The next year this fell slightly to 1,000 dollars, but it was claimed he was continuing to play a leading role in the Ukrainian Party of Labour (UPP), the party founded by Petrushevych in May 1927 as a breakaway group from the UNDO.⁵³

Even after the Bolsheviks had decided to fund Petrushevych, they continued to keep him at arms length. On 4th May 1926 the KP(b)U's committee on foreign affairs resolved that Petrushevych should not be allowed to come to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic because after leaving Berlin his position as representative of the UNDO was occupied by a group who were more hostile to the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ It is not stated whether Petrushevych wanted to travel the Ukraine for talks or whether he intended to settle there permanently. Either way, clearly the Bolsheviks would not accede to any of Petrushevych's demands which might hinder the overall purpose behind the support given to him: the goals of destabilising the Polish state and splitting the Ukrainian emigration should not be endangered.

⁵⁰ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.252.

⁵¹ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2484 ark.11.

⁵² TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.28.

⁵³ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.185.

⁵⁴ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.2 ark.219.

Petrushevych did not adopt a Sovietophile position simply in response to the Ambassadors' Decision of March 1923; his government had already been discussing this option for several years before this. As Wehrhahn stresses, Petrushevych's hatred for the Poles led him to adopt a pro-Soviet position, despite the contradictions between the conservative inclinations of the east Galician elite and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary task.⁵⁵ This geopolitical orientation originated in an orientation towards Russia, whether it be represented by Denikin or the Bolsheviks. However, Petrushevych accommodated his ideology to Bolshevism in order to obtain Soviet support. Petrushevych and his circle had been a product of the traditions of Habsburg parliamentarianism and in 1918 had held correspondingly conservative social opinions; by 1927 even the Bolsheviks described him as left wing. Clearly, out of geopolitical considerations Petrushevych undertook a 'turn to the left'. One example presented here was the discussion before Nazaruk's journey to Copenhagen in which Lev Petrushevych sought to work out a guidelines for ZUNR policy which would make the government seem attractive to the Soviet governments. Any future research must concentrate on this interplay between geopolitical imperatives and ideological accommodation if it is to give an accurate picture of the Sovietophilism of the ZUNR government in exile.

Émigré Military Organisations and Internees from Galicia

Petrushevych was not the only east Galician to seek support from the Soviet Ukrainian authorities. Another organisation was the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO). The UVO emerged in 1920/1921 out of a number of organisations created by émigré Galician soldiers. Its leading member was Colonel Ievhen Konovalets, who had led the Sich Sharpshooters (the military unit formed from Galician and Bukovinan prisoners of war held in the eastern Ukraine during the First World War) during the revolution. It was nominally under the authority of the ZUNR government, but relations between Konovalets and Petrushevych were rocky, probably because the latter rightly saw the Colonel as a challenge to his authority. A power struggle went on within the organisation until January 1925, when Konovalets finally expelled Petrushevych's supporters within the group at a UVO conference in Uzhhorod. Petrushevych and Konovalets differed over a number of issues. Above all, Konovalets favoured an all-Ukrainian approach, whereas Petrushevych concentrated on Galician affairs. However, Petrushevych's Sovietophilism is also often cited as one of the points of disagreement between the leader of the ZUNR and the head of the UVO. The organisation committed assassinations and arson attacks within eastern Galicia. Many of its members were attracted by the new brand of radical, right-wing Ukrainian nationalism which emerged between the two world wars. Indeed Konovalets aided Dmytro Dontsov, the prophet of this ideology, in setting up the journal *Zahrava*. With other nationalist organisations, the UVO was instrumental in founding the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which during the Second World War collaborated with the National Socialists.⁵⁶ Given this information it would seem incongruous that such an organisation would seek support from the Bolsheviks.

⁵⁵ Wehrhahn, *Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, p.282.

⁵⁶ For the history of the UVO see Motyl, *Turn*, pp.105–28 and Kentii, *UVO*.

However, during the Bolshevik invasion of Galicia the Ukrainian soldiers in exile had also expressed the belief that the Soviet annexation of the province would promote Ukrainian unity. At a conference of officers organised by a number of Galician soldiers' organisations in August 1920, a resolution was passed which stated that the 'the congress considers it correct not to offer military resistance to the unification of the Ukrainian lands that is currently taking place as a result of the Bolshevik advance and simultaneously calls upon all officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army to further steadfast struggle for the independence of the Ukraine'.⁵⁷ Similarly, in a letter to Galicia from May 1921 Ievhen Konovalts reported that part of the emigration which represented Galicia and to a certain extent the Sich Sharpshooters thought that 'it is not necessary to attack the Bolsheviks too sharply in matters which affect Galicia because the Bolsheviks not only recognise the independence of Galicia, but even more, its present government (of the dictator) [referring to Petrushevych] too'.⁵⁸ According to the Polish ministry of defence, in autumn 1921 individual members of the UVO started to establish relations with the Soviet missions in Paris, Berlin and Vienna and close contacts with Galician commanders in the Soviet Ukraine. Polish agents reported that a plan had been drawn up between Galician soldiers and the head of the Red Army in the Ukraine M.V. Frunze whereby the Bolsheviks would grant military and material support to a rising in Galicia. Supposedly, a formal pact had been signed between the governments of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (represented by M. Levytskyi) and the ZUNR in Prague. The Soviets would allow the east Galician émigré formations to mobilise on the borders of Galicia. From the south the remnants of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army (ChUHA), which had defected to the Bolsheviks in February 1920, would attack the province, while an invasion from the north by units of Polish Communists and internationalists would take place. Ten military units posing as members of agricultural communes would infiltrate the province through settlements along the Zbruch. Their goal would be to coordinate actions with revolutionary and Ukrainian nationalist groups in the Ukraine. Though the Polish sources did not claim that such a plan came to fruition, they did report that before the middle of November 1922 eight partisan units of the ChUHA led by a V. Poraiko crossed from the Soviet Ukraine into Galicia to support the uprising taking place there. The Foreign Division of the KP(b)U (Zakordot) supported the risings in other Ukrainian regions occupied by Poland, above all in Volhynia.⁵⁹

It is unclear to what extent some of the information on contacts between the UVO and the Bolsheviks were a product of speculation or accurate intelligence. Certainly, as has been discussed above, the representatives of the ZUNR were regularly meeting officials of the Soviet government at this time. In 1921 the UVO was still nominally under the authority of the ZUNR, so such contacts may really have existed. However, in the documents of the Ukrainian foreign plenipotentiary representatives seen by this author, no such agreement was mentioned. Nevertheless, there were certainly Galician military groups turning to the Bolsheviks for support in a possible rising against the Poles, and there were Soviet officials who unquestionably espoused such a venture. In July 1922 a group of Galicians asked Aussem for ½ million marks to support an insurrection against

⁵⁷ Quoted in Motyl, *Turn*, pp.98–9.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Kentii, *UVO*, p.42.

⁵⁹ Vasiuta, 'Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh', p.40; Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine. 1919–1929*, Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983, pp.14–5.

the Poles. Aussem was in favour of giving them help, but in the form of arms rather than cash. He called for a speedy decision because the group intended to start their rising in September. Kaliuzhnyi also wrote to Kharkiv calling for a resolution on the matter. He claimed that a peasant terror was taking place in the province and that this was a sign of a coming outburst.⁶⁰ Shumskyi mentioned on 14th August 1922 that a colonel Z. Suliatskyi had turned to him saying that he represented an underground organisation of Galician officers which wanted to put themselves under Soviet command. They advocated the union of eastern Galicia with the Soviet Ukraine and opposed Petrushevych.⁶¹ It was not mentioned whether any of these groups had anything to do with the UVO. At the end of August 1922 a rising took place in the province, and the soldiers who approached the Soviet representatives may have been involved in this.

The international recognition of Poland's annexation of eastern Galicia in March 1923 offered a new opportunity for rapprochement between the Ukrainian military groups and the Bolshevik government in Kharkiv. Following the March Decision a report was sent to Petrushevych claiming that pro-Soviet feeling was growing among the UVO: 'Reports of the spread of Communist activity are arriving from all sections of the VO [military organisation][...]. In certain centres of the VO the best members have gone over to the Communist camp'.⁶² Even the leadership of the organisation was prepared to turn to the Bolsheviks for help. Either at the end of 1923 or beginning of 1924, Konovalts turned to the Politburo with a request for financial support. Konovalts's request for funding was discussed on 7th December 1924 at the same time as that made by Petrushevych. As mentioned above, at that time both applications were rejected and Petrushevych only later received financial support.⁶³ Though there is no evidence that the UVO received funding, even as late as spring 1927 there were rumours among Petrushevych's circle that the UVO was looking for help from the Bolsheviks to create a legion in the event of a Polish-Soviet war.⁶⁴ The failure of the UVO to secure funding from the Soviets might be an indication that shared geopolitical interests were not enough to enable cooperation with the Soviet regime. Perhaps at least some level of ideological affinity, or at least a willingness to accommodate one's beliefs to the Bolsheviks' world view, was a pre-requisite to receiving support from the Soviet governments. Until more documents are uncovered on the relationship between the two, and in particular on the reasons for the Bolsheviks' refusal to support the UVO, it is impossible to make more precise conclusions.

In addition to these political manoeuvres, many of the former soldiers of the Galician army wanted to come to terms with the Soviet regime in that they hoped to immigrate to the Soviet Ukraine. Though Ie. Levytskyi's conversation with M. Levytskyi following the March Decision seems to be the first occasion at which the matter of transporting groups of the UHA to the Soviet Ukraine arose, individual members of the Galician army had been petitioning the Soviet authorities for permission to immigrate for some time. In August 1922 the consular section of the mission in Prague reported that a number of Galicians who had fought for the ZUNR against Poland had turned to them with

⁶⁰ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.11.

⁶¹ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1016 ark.13.

⁶² Kentii, *UVO*, p.34.

⁶³ Kentii, *UVO*, p.45; TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.40.

⁶⁴ Kentii, *UVO*, p.36.

applications to enter the country because they could not return to Polish occupied Galicia. He quoted one such soldier as being representative: 'We are not Bolsheviks, but it is better for us to live with the Bolsheviks than with the Poles'. Others claimed to have fought in the Red Army against the Poles, to have been captured and to have escaped to Czechoslovakia. Both groups were hampered in their applications by their lack of documents.⁶⁵ Similarly, Ukrainians from Volhynia and Kholm turned to him because they also did not want to live under Polish rule, while Ukrainians from Bessarabia hoped to acquire Ukrainian citizenship in order to escape the Rumanians.⁶⁶ According to Kaliuzhnyi in Vienna, the Galicians who had turned to him towards the end of 1922 and beginning of 1923 were mainly students who wanted to travel to the Soviet Ukraine in order to find work as they could not go to Poland for this.⁶⁷ In all of these communiqués it was clear that the Ukrainian representatives did not have any instructions from Kharkiv on how to deal with the western Ukrainians turning to them for help as they regularly asked for directives on how to handle the applications. For example, in summer 1921 M. Levytskyi wrote to Kharkiv asking how they should deal with those western Ukrainians who wanted to move to the Ukrainian SSR. He claimed that there were party courses taking place within the camps; however, the emphasis of these courses was more on sending able propagandists back to the Polish-occupied province than allowing Galician Ukrainians into the Soviet republic (although M. Levytskyi did mention that this might take place).⁶⁸

Therefore, before the March Decision, Galician immigration was not given priority: the main goal was to create a network of Communist agents within the province. Only at the beginning of March, shortly before the Ambassadors' Decision, did the Politburo start looking at procedures for allowing Galicians to come to the Ukraine. On the 2nd two Politburo members were asked to work out a concrete proposal for the organization of Ukrainians arriving from Poland and Galicia. The Ukrainian Politburo hoped to come to an agreement with Moscow whereby some Galicians would be sent to the Russian Soviet Republic. The arrival of Galicians coming from Germany, who on the whole were there as individuals, would be regulated in agreement with the GPU.⁶⁹ Soon after the Ambassadors' Decision it became clear to the Soviet authorities that the number of Ukrainians from the province applying to enter the Soviet Republics would increase. In a report of 11th April 1923 Kaliuzhnyi, wrote that the recent decision would mean that applications for entry to the Ukraine might take on a mass character. It was therefore imperative that he receive directions in this matter.⁷⁰ In fact, the day before the Politburo resolved that it was essential to allow Galicians into the Ukrainian SSR and suggested using them in the Donbas.⁷¹ However, Kharkiv's leeway for action was somewhat limited by opposition from the Russian government. On 3rd April the commissariat for foreign affairs in Moscow wrote to Kharkiv complaining that the Ukrainian representatives had been too lenient in dealing with people applying to come to the Soviet

⁶⁵ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 ark.6.

⁶⁶ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.809 akr.35zv.

⁶⁷ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.798 ark.3.

⁶⁸ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.560 ark.10, 43zv.

⁶⁹ TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.25.

⁷⁰ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.798 ark.4–5.

⁷¹ TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.44.

Ukraine; an objection which was accepted in the Ukrainian capital. Despite this, on the 26th the commissariat for foreign affairs in Kharkiv decided that it was possible to allow east Galician émigrés to come to the Ukraine following the necessary checks. Under certain conditions, financial support would also be granted to them. Special care should be taken in distributing them among different regions.⁷²

On 17th September the Politburo first discussed a plan to bring 1,000 Galicians to the Soviet Ukraine.⁷³ A few days later, the Ukrainian commissariat for foreign affairs reported receiving a declaration from the interned Galicians announcing their wish to enter the Ukraine as a 'Galician Legion'. This may well have been the same group under discussion. However, the compiler of the report was against using the Galician soldiers: they were a 'hopeless element'; their officers were characterised as being Shapovalists⁷⁴ or fascists. It would also harm Soviet relations with Poland and make it harder to criticise the Polish support for the Petliurists. The commissariat suggested that those wishing to immigrate to the Soviet Ukraine should do so individually following extensive checks. Kaliuzhnyi, who was now in Prague, also argued against using the soldiers of the UHA, saying that many of their officers were reactionary. Only individuals should be allowed into the Ukraine following personal checks. Yet another report from this period advised against using the Galicians, describing the majority as 'trash'. It felt that the use to be got from them was small, whereas the possible harm they could inflict was great. Despite the clear reservations which existed within the Soviet foreign service, the Politburo continued to argue in favour of accepting the group, but promised that the necessary inspections would be made.⁷⁵ In November a plan was put forward on the use of the 1,000 Galicians: 400 should be used for work abroad; the rest would join the Red Army or administration in Terchast, in Left-bank Ukraine. Political reasons dictated that only here would they be acceptable. A few days later Frunze was instructed to establish the 'physiognomy' of the military organisations and look into financing the project. However, on 20th June 1924 it was decided that as a result of the difficult conditions, drought, unemployment and rejection by the war department, the Galicians could not be accepted into the Ukraine.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the plan was soon revived, albeit in a truncated form. On 1st August 1924 the Russian Politburo accepted a proposal put forward by the Ukraine according to which 150 Galicians and 50 Ukrainians would be allowed into the Soviet Union. One group would join the army. A second would be made up of qualified workers who would be sent to Baku in Azerbaijan. In addition, 200 families of agriculturalists would be settled in Cherkasskyi Okrug, in eastern Ukraine. The OGPU was instructed to conduct checks on the applicants. 11 days later a commission of three, including M. Levytskyi, was formed to deal with the Galicians coming from Czechoslovakia. Some should be sent to work in the Donbas, while others should be sent to Sovkhozy and Kolkhozy. The Ukrainian government would turn to the Russian Central Committee for financial support for this project. In August of the next year, the matter was again discussed. Again it decided that 200 Galicians should be accepted, who should be qualified profes-

⁷² TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.873 ark.17–8, 22.

⁷³ TsDAHO f.1 op.6 spr.40 ark.112.

⁷⁴ Supporters of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Mykyta Shapoval.

⁷⁵ TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.615 ark.20–1, 29, 31zv, 34–5.

⁷⁶ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.5, 10, 51.

sionals. Funding should come from the Union.⁷⁷ It is not recorded whether these plans were enacted. Clearly there were groups of Galicians being transported to the Ukraine. Rublov, in his book on Stalinism and the west Ukrainian intelligentsia, mentions three transports bringing former troops of the UHA from Prague to the Ukraine. They arrived in December 1924, November 1925 and summer 1926 and carried about 500 people. In addition, a further convoy from Vienna arrived in the Ukraine in October 1925.⁷⁸ The Soviet representative in Prague Prykhodko mentioned the successful movement of Galicians to the Ukraine in a report of September 1925 and he talked of a further 100 Galicians who still hoped to travel to the Ukraine.⁷⁹ However, the Politburo later put a stop to the mass transportation of whole groups. In June 1927 the Politburo acknowledged that it was impossible to transport all the Galicians; rather, checks should be conducted to find out who could arrive individually.⁸⁰ In the same month, for example, 29 Galician graduates of the Ukrainian agricultural academy in Podebrad crossed into the Soviet Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian GPU allowed them in because he believed that they might undertake practical work and be useful citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.⁸¹

The Soviet authorities' considerations in the matter of the interned Galicians demonstrates the contradictions of the stated 'Piedmont principle'. The Galicians' hatred of the Poles was a tempting weapon in any possible conflict with the Soviet Ukraine's neighbour. However, the Bolsheviks were highly suspicious of the Galicians' political loyalties. Even when they were allowed into the Soviet Ukraine, much effort was made, at least in theory, to screen them politically and to dispatch them to provinces in which they could not conduct activities harmful to the Soviet regime. In so far as one can make out the motives of the Galician soldiers themselves from the Soviet documents, for some the Polish occupation of their homeland ruled out a return to the province. Though not Bolsheviks themselves, it was the reprisals from the Poles that they feared. In addition, the Polish state had closed many avenues to the Ukrainian soldiers. For example, the stipulation that university applicants had to have served in the Polish army prevented the former soldiers of the UHA from studying in their homeland: in order to attend a university they either had to enter one of the émigré institutions or travel to the Soviet Ukraine. The relationship between the Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian Military Organisation is, at the moment, even more inscrutable and perhaps can only be made clearer when it is possible to read the relevant materials in the secret service archives in Moscow and Kyiv.

⁷⁷ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.97, 99, 222.

⁷⁸ O.S Rublov and Iu. A. Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentii. 20–50ti roky XX st.*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994, p.26. Unfortunately, Rublov and Cherchenko only give a reference for the first of the convoys from Prague.

⁷⁹ TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.256.

⁸⁰ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.3a ark.122.

⁸¹ Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, p.26.

The immigration of West Ukrainian Intellectuals to the Ukraine

In spring 1923 the Bolsheviks introduced the policy of *korenizatsiia* or 'indigenisation' which sought to strengthen Soviet rule in the non-Russian areas, where support for Bolshevism had been very weak, by recruiting party cadres from the non-Russian nationalities, by conducting the business of government in the language of the local population and by promoting the development of the local language and culture. The Ukrainian variant of *korenizatsiia*, Ukrainianisation, was prosecuted by some members of the KP(b)U with great enthusiasm. The two most prominent were the commissars of education Oleksandr Shumskyi, a former *Borotbist*, that is a member of the left wing of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party which had joined the KP(b)U, and Mykola Skrypnyk, an old Bolshevik of Ukrainian descent. The achievements of Ukrainianisation included the creation of Ukrainian schools, technical colleges and universities, the standardisation of the Ukrainian orthography, the promotion of Ukrainian learning in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the foundation of Ukrainian writers' associations like *Pluh* and HART and the cultural renaissance represented by the writings of Mykola Khvylovyi and in Les Kurbas's theatre group *Berezil*. However, the policy was never uncontested within the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state organs. In 1926 a row developed after Shumskyi called on Stalin to place a Ukrainian at the head of the Soviet Ukrainian government and increase the pace of Ukrainianisation. The following year Shumskyi was forced to resign and Skrypnyk replaced him as commissar for education. Skrypnyk had been an opponent of Shumskyi, but he rigorously pursued Ukrainianisation. However, with the onset of the Stalinist 'revolution from above', the Ukrainianisers became increasingly seen as impediments to economic centralisation. The Ukrainian intelligentsia were persecuted. For example, in 1929 a fictive conspiratorial organisation, the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU), was 'uncovered'. Its 'members', which included many leading academics from the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, were prosecuted in 1930 and most were sent to prison. Later, Bolsheviks like Skrypnyk who had supported Ukrainianisation were purged. By 1933 Ukrainianisation had been abandoned and the Soviet Ukraine, wracked by famine, had lost much of its appeal for Ukrainians in eastern Galicia.⁸²

Following the introduction of the policy of Ukrainianisation, the Soviet authorities were faced with the problem that they lacked qualified Ukrainian-speaking staff to occupy the positions once taken by Russian speakers. For example, one report on the agricultural institute in Kyiv from 1926 divided the professors working there into two groups: the first were old, Russian, highly qualified and bitter opponents of both the new methods of teaching and Ukrainianisation; the second were young, Ukrainian, favourably disposed towards the Soviet system and were happy to implement the instructions of the people's commissariat of education – however, they were less well qualified than the first group and had less scientific authority.⁸³ Under the Romanovs the restrictions on the Ukrainian language had meant that Russian was the passport to a higher education;

⁸² Ukrainianisation and *korenizatsiia* are described in Martin, *Affirmative Action* and James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.

⁸³ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.2210 ark.41.

university institutions in the Ukraine were dominated by Russian speakers. However, in eastern Galicia the Habsburgs' relative tolerance of the Ukrainian national movement had allowed the development of a Ukrainian intelligentsia. The province therefore represented a large pool of well-educated Ukrainian speakers and the Soviet Ukrainian authorities were keen to encourage west Ukrainian intellectuals to take up positions in the Ukraine in order to overcome the shortfall there. On 6th August 1925, in a sitting which looked at the implementation of Ukrainianisation, the Politburo decided to use the west Ukrainian intelligentsia for this purpose.⁸⁴ A number of western Ukrainians took the opportunity to travel to the Soviet Ukraine and take up academic posts there. As a consequence, a small intellectual community of western Ukrainians began to appear in the Soviet Ukraine. Several organisations were established for them. At the beginning of 1925, a club for political émigrés from the western Ukraine was created in Kharkiv. Its head was Matvii Iavorskyi, a Galician who had helped bring about the defection of the Ukrainian Galician Army in 1920, and who later became the chief ideologue of a Ukrainian-Marxist version of history. In April 1925 a west Ukrainian section of the peasant writers' organisation *Pluh* was formed. In 1927 this was then reformed into a separate group called 'Western Ukraine', which had over fifty members, including the Galician writer Mykhailo Kozoris.⁸⁵

Stepan Rudnytskyi was one of the more prominent academics to receive a post in the Ukraine. He had studied under Mykhailo Hrushevkyi at the University of Lviv and gone on to specialise in geography. In 1901 he became a full member of the Scientific Society of Taras Shevchenko. Before the war he taught grammar schools and published several works on Ukrainian geography. During the First World War he wrote a number of propagandistic texts supporting the Ukrainian cause. Following the proclamation of the ZUNR he was appointed as an advisor on economic and politico-geographic affairs. In this post he prepared several texts which were sent to the Paris peace congresses in favour of eastern Galicia's position. He continued to serve the ZUNR when it went into exile. For example, in 1922 he was part of Petrushevych's unofficial delegation to Genoa. As mentioned above, at this time the ZUNR was already engaged in talks with the Soviet republics, despite its public orientation towards the Entente. This activity on behalf of the ZUNR may have begun Rudnytskyi's conversion to a Sovietophile position. After the opening of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague in 1921, Rudnytskyi was appointed deacon of the faculty of philosophy. He worked at the university until he immigrated to the Ukraine in 1926. He then settled in Kharkiv where he served as professor of geography at the Kharkiv Institute of People's Education. He also set up the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Geography and Cartography and became the first professor of geography in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In 1933 he was arrested for 'fascism' and sent to a prison camp where he was executed in 1937.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1976 ark.127.

⁸⁵ Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, p.30–2. For more on Iavorskyi see Mace, *Communism*, pp.232–63; for more on Kozoris see O.S. Rublov, 'Mykhailo Kozoris: dolia intelihenta', *Ukrainskyi arkhoehrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, Vol.5, 1983, No.2, pp.104–22.

⁸⁶ There are a number of accounts of Rudnytskyi's life, none of which is keen to explain his immigration to the Soviet Union. See O.S. Rublov, 'Fundator Ukrainskoi heohrafichnoi nauky (S.L. Rudnytskyi)', in *Represovane kraieznastvo(20–30ti rokiv)*, Kyiv: Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 1991, pp.121–9. Oleh Shablii, 'Peredmova' in Stepan Rudnytskyi, *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: Svit, 1994, pp.5–

Rudnytskyi is perhaps one of the more surprising Sovietophiles. His public political views do not seem to provide a natural basis for cooperation with the Bolsheviks. Although he was no supporter of Dontsov or Konovalets, his works during the inter-war period do not seem to deviate greatly from the dominant trend of integral nationalism; it would not be unfair to call Rudnytskyi a racist. In his *Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu* (On the foundations of Ukrainian nationalism) of 1923, Rudnytskyi included among the characteristics which must provide the basis of the new Ukrainian national culture 'purity of race', 'eugenics', 'the cult of individualism' and 'aristocracy of the spirit'.⁸⁷ Moreover, Rudnytskyi attacked 'socialist-communist universalism' for denying the 'scientific reality' according to which mankind was divided into nations. Because of the hold which socialism had exercised over Ukrainian youth, this form of universalism had been especially damaging to Ukrainian nationalism by weakening Ukrainian national consciousness.⁸⁸ Perhaps it is therefore understandable that Rudnytskyi was not entirely open about his decision to return to the Ukraine. Though there were clearly rumours about his departure for the Ukraine, Rudnytskyi did not tell the Free University about his intentions. Dmytro Doroshenko, one of Rudnytskyi's colleagues at the Free University, claimed in a letter to Viacheslav Lypynskyi that right up until the end Rudnytskyi 'denied that he was travelling and only made an announcement on this on 2nd October, because on the 1st he had received his salary for the month of October from the University. Then a few days latter he packed and left.'⁸⁹

However, there were perhaps some elements in Rudnytskyi's thought which offered a basis for cohabitation with the Soviet regime. Rudnytskyi's conviction that nationalism was an essential part of human nature seems to have given him the belief that even the Bolsheviks would eventually have to take the nation into account. After explaining his 'scientific' understanding of Ukrainian nationalism in *Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu*, Rudnytskyi sought to impress on the reader 'that the genuinely new Ukrainian nationalism is not a party matter; this means that all Ukrainians regardless of party must think and act nationally: from anarchists and Communists to the far right. Because even genuine cosmopolitanism [and] internationalism is impossible without nationalism. A future, general unification of mankind in one, uniform community can of scientific necessity under no circumstances take place outside the nations.... The cosmopolitan future is the powerful harmony of the great choir of nations, in which every people raises its voice'.⁹⁰ Rudnytskyi may well have seen the introduction of Ukrainianisation as a recognition by the Bolsheviks of this. Moreover, Rudnytskyi explicitly appealed to the commonplace that all Ukrainians should work together for the good of the nation. It would seem that for him the call to place the interests of the nation above those of party and class could also bridge the gap between right-wing nationalism and Communism. Certainly, other evidence suggests that Rudnytskyi hoped to return to the Ukraine in order to devote himself to the reconstruction of the country and that he believed that this

34; Pavlo Shtoiko, *Stepan Rudnytskyi 1877–1937. Zhyttiepysno-bibliohrafichnyi narys*, Lviv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeni Shevchenka, 1997.

⁸⁷ Stepan Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov Ukrainskoho natsionalizmu', in S. Rudnytskyi, *Chomu my khochemo samostiinoi Ukrainy*, Lviv: NTSh, 1994, pp.272–348 (p.348).

⁸⁸ Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', pp.284–9.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, p.35.

⁹⁰ Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', p.346. One should not be deceived by Rudnytskyi's idyllic metaphor. He was also a firm believer in the biological inequality of different nations. Rudnytskyi, 'Do osnov', pp.276–9.

work was possible under the Soviet regime. After his arrest in 1933 Rudnytskyi gave an explanation for this immigration to the Ukraine which would seem to support this thesis: 'I am an old nationalist-cultural worker who happily came to serve the Soviet Ukraine on the cultural front, in which the Ukraine, thanks to the new national policy, [had] received some autonomy. I did not pretend to be an enthusiastic Soviet, but stood on a position of an objective, partyless Ukrainian.'⁹¹

Rudnytskyi's belief that it was possible to serve Ukrainian national interests in the Soviet Ukraine was typical of the mood that emerged in the west Ukrainian lands following the Ambassadors' Decision and the introduction of Ukrainianisation. Characteristic of this trend was a letter from one Ukrainian living in Rumania to a young Sovietophile Mykola Leontovych saying that they should not fall out of contact merely because Leontovych had adopted a pro-Soviet orientation: 'the time is such that we all have to be just Ukrainians, Ukrainians and Ukrainians, and to the devil with any party differences! [...]. It will be so between us when we hear only "Ukrainian" and "Ukraine" and we do not hear "Soviet", "Hetmanite" or "Petliurite" [...] for a brother must not sell or kill a brother, as do all our parties'.⁹² Even the UNDO, the moderate, conservative party in eastern Galicia, which later became a decisive opponent of the Soviet regime, proclaimed at its party congress in November 1926 that 'beyond the border created by Riga in the Ukrainian Soviet lands great national progress is taking place. National culture is growing there; national forces are stronger; processes are being revived there that sooner or later will restore sovereign rights in the Ukraine to the whole Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people under Poland turn to these national forces and to these national successes which are growing beyond the Dniipro'.⁹³ The high point of this tendency was in the mid-1920s, by which time Ukrainianisation was already capable of claiming a number of successes. However, as early as 1927, following the affair over the removal of Shumskyi from his post, support for the Soviet Ukraine on national grounds began to ebb. By the onset of the 1930s, due to the famine and the purges in the Ukraine, this position had practically disappeared.

Mykhailo Lozynskyi

Mykhailo Lozynskyi, too, was attracted to the Soviet Ukraine by its apparent national achievements. Before the First World War Lozynskyi had worked in eastern Galicia as a publicist, contributing to the Ukrainian paper *Dilo*. His main interest naturally was the conflict between the Poles and Ukrainians in eastern Galicia, although he also looked at the situation of Ukrainians under the Russian empire. His writings included a critique of Marx and Engel's treatment of the national question. In addition, he wrote a number of historical studies of the Cossacks and Haidamaky. Following the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and the outbreak of hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian populations of eastern Galicia, Lozynskyi became a negotiator for the Ukrainians with the Poles. In March 1919 he was appointed the ZUNR's deputy secretary of foreign affairs. The following month he travelled to Paris as part of the west Ukrainian government's

⁹¹ Quoted in Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, p.35.

⁹² TsDAHO f.1 op.20 spr.1738 ark.147; TsDAVO f.4 op.1 spr.15 ark.145.

⁹³ *Tysiacha rokiv ukrainskoi suspilno-politychnoi dumky. Tom VII (20ti–40vi roky XXst.)*, Kyiv: Dniipro, 2001, p.165.

delegation to the peace conference there. In accordance with the tactic followed by Petrushevych at the time, he petitioned the Entente in the hope that they would refuse to recognise Poland's annexation of eastern Galicia. Following a reshuffle of the ZUNR's delegation to the peace conferences, Lozynskyi left Paris and ceased to work for the west Ukrainian government. He was involved in setting up the Ukrainian Free University in Vienna and following its transfer to Prague he became professor of international law at the university. He held this post until his return to the Ukraine in 1927.⁹⁴

Following his departure from the ZUNR diplomatic mission to Paris, Lozynskyi began to write a history of the Galician revolution with Mykhailo Hrushevskyy's encouragement. In this way, he came in contact with the Sovietophile position which Hrushevskyy was at that time propagating in his journal *Boritiesia-poborete!*. On 14th September 1920 Lozynskyi sent a letter to Hrushevskyy about the line taken by *Boritiesia-poborete!*. He wrote that he understood Hrushevskyy's goal to be the consolidation of active Ukrainian forces in the country on the basis of Ukrainian statehood in Soviet form. 'If there is really such a possibility', concluded Lozynskyi, 'then this can only be welcomed'.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, as his history of the revolution in Galicia shows, Lozynskyi had not yet adopted a pro-Soviet stance himself. He concluded the work with the assertion that only through help from the Entente or from a powerful state in the eastern Ukraine could eastern Galicia acquire statehood. At that time the eastern Ukraine was too weak to fulfil this role; the Treaty of Riga, at which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had given up Ukrainian land, was evidence of this. Ukrainians in eastern Galicia must therefore place their hopes in the Entente. The objections to the Soviet Ukraine expressed in the history were more practical than ideological: his belief in the weakness of the Soviet Republics ruled out a pro-Soviet orientation, not opposition to Bolshevism. Lozynskyi's argument that the Entente was unlikely to agree to attaching eastern Galicia to the rest of the Ukraine under its present form of government is again more a functional argument than one based on political principles. Moreover, Lozynskyi expressed the belief that the eastern Ukraine found itself in a state of national and socio-political flux and it might begin to develop as a Ukrainian state.⁹⁶ Lozynskyi probably therefore gave an accurate account of his views at this time in the autobiography which he wrote for the GPU after he had been arrested: he described himself as following a 'decisive line against the Poles and a non-decisive one against the Bolsheviks' and believing that the course taken by Petrushevych should be carried to its end.⁹⁷

As for many others, the March Decision on eastern Galicia ended Lozynskyi's orientation towards the Entente and redoubled his opposition to the Poles. According to his autobiography, around June 1923, Petrushevych turned to him with the suggestion of

⁹⁴ A brief description of Lozynskyi's life can be found in Oleksii Slukhyi, *Mykhailo Lozynskyi: vchenyi, hromadskyy diiach, polityk*, Lviv, 1995. Lozynskyi himself gives a more tendentious account in the autobiography he wrote following his arrest by the GPU. The sketch is an attempt to refute the charges of belonging to an anti-Soviet underground organisation and seeks to assert Lozynskyi's lifelong commitment to socialist revolution. Nevertheless, there are some interesting details which are supported by other evidence. The autobiography is published at the end of an article by Rublov. See O.S Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky: radianske desiatyrychchia Mykhaila Lozynskoho', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1997, No.4, pp.103–35.

⁹⁵ TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.611 ark.4-4zv.

⁹⁶ Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v rr.1918–1920*, New York: Chervona Kalyna, 1970, p.218f.

⁹⁷ Rublov, 'Shliakhamy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, p.126.

cooperation. The dictator informed Lozynskiyi of his contacts with the Soviet governments and of his belief that the Ukrainian territories could only be liberated from Poland with the help of the Soviet Union. Petrushevych claimed he was not a Communist himself and that it was unimportant what type of system appeared in eastern Galicia in the future, even if it was Soviet. Petrushevych also maintained links to the UVO at that time. As a representative of the ZUNR dictator, Lozynskiyi, too, came into contact with the group, which at that time had sent emissaries to Moscow and Kharkiv. In addition, Lozynskiyi was involved in setting up the 'Committee of peoples enslaved by Poland', which included Belarusians and Lithuanians alongside Ukrainians and sought to conduct propaganda against the Polish regime. It was as a representative of Petrushevych that at the end of 1923 or beginning of 1924 Lozynskiyi first met the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiary in Prague Naum Kaliuzhnyi. According to his autobiography Lozynskiyi kept up the acquaintance.⁹⁸

Lozynskiyi's views on the Soviet Ukraine at this time can be seen in a brochure from January 1924, *Z novym rokom 1924. Teperishnii stan budovy Ukrainskoi derzhavy i zadachi zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemel* (Happy New Year, 1924. The present state of the construction of a Ukrainian state and the task of the west Ukrainian lands). The pamphlet did not argue that the Soviet Ukraine had already come to represent a form of Ukrainian statehood, but rather that developments within the Ukrainian SSR provided the departing point for the creation of a united, independent Ukraine. If one looked at how the Soviet form of statehood was established in the Ukraine, Lozynskiyi admitted, then one must say that it is Muscovite occupation. Moreover, through the formation of the Soviet Union in 1923, a federal state had been created. Consequently, the legal independence which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had enjoyed before had been replaced by dependence on Moscow. He therefore concluded that '[a]ccording to a *legal point of view*, the Soviet Ukraine as a constitutive part of the Soviet federation presents itself as a *non-sovereign state*'.⁹⁹ Thus, though the Soviet Ukraine was a state, it 'is not the expression of Ukrainian statehood which would answer our aspirations', for the federal form of statehood 'is not the form in which a separate nation would be able to find [...] state independence'. Lozynskiyi believed that federal states invariably became increasingly centralised and their constituent parts gradually lost what independence they did have. He compared the Soviet Union to the German federation, with Moscow playing the same role as Prussia. Lozynskiyi warned against the danger of the Soviet Union providing the basis of a future European federation of socialist republics: in its present form the Soviet Union showed too much inclination to centralisation for this to be healthy.¹⁰⁰

At the same time, Lozynskiyi argued that the Ukraine had nevertheless taken a great step forward. The Ukraine had once been a part of a one and indivisible Russia. It had struggled for independence and acquired the status of a state, albeit within the Soviet federation. One could see this both from the opportunities for development within the Ukrainian SSR and its entry onto the field of international politics. Ukrainians must recognise the fact that they had acquired statehood and bring the rest of the world to acknowledge

⁹⁸ Rublov, 'Shliakhmy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, pp.126–7.

⁹⁹ Mykhailo Lozynskiyi, *Z novym rokom 1924. Teperishnii stan budovy Ukrainskoi derzhavy i zadachi zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemel*, Geneva: published at the expense of the author, 1924, p.4.

¹⁰⁰ Lozynskiyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.4–6. The quotation is on p.5.

what the Ukraine had achieved. This statehood should be made into a starting point from which a united, independent Ukrainian state could be created. Lozynskyi stressed that the Soviet constitution 'finds itself in the process of creation' and thus it could move in the direction of either centralisation or decentralisation. Moreover, he saw a number of indicators that would allow positive developments. Unlike other federal constitutions, the Soviet constitution granted its separate parts the right to leave the federation. Although he admitted that under present conditions the ability to use this right was illusory, he felt that future developments might make it important.¹⁰¹

Within the territory which formed the Soviet Union, Lozynskyi observed a growth in national and state consciousness among the Ukrainian masses which was forcing Moscow to make concessions to it. The revolution itself had done the Ukraine a service in destroying the ruling social classes in the Ukraine, which had been the basis of Muscovite rule there. At the same time, it had strengthened the Ukrainian peasantry through the redistribution of landowners' land. He predicted that the towns, surrounded by a nationally conscious and economically powerful peasantry, would have to become Ukrainian. Lozynskyi stressed the difference between the aims of the Soviet state and these developments taking place within it: the regime, '[by] making concessions to these tendencies for its own interests, causes developments which are outgrowing it'. At that time the Soviet regime was making new compromises with the Ukraine in the form of the Ukrainianisation of state power. This he described as an end to the Muscovite character of power which had existed up to that time. Though he admitted that it was unclear how complete this break with the past had been, Lozynskyi stressed that it was obvious that Ukrainianisation meant that the Soviet regime was having to take the growth of the national and state consciousness among the Ukrainian popular masses into account and that they were looking to acquire the sympathy of Ukrainians living beyond the borders of the Ukrainian SSR. Lozynskyi conceded that up to now Ukrainianisation had been merely 'mechanical' in that officials could easily return to speaking Russian despite the requirement to learn Ukrainian and use it in state organs. Only by including Ukrainians in the state executive could organic Ukrainianisation take place. However, he warned against disdaining mechanical Ukrainianisation. People had to go to Ukrainian schools and were becoming accustomed to hearing it in state life. These were also 'organic' achievements.¹⁰²

Lozynskyi summed up his feelings on the Soviet Union thus: 'And so legal and real dependence on Moscow on the one hand, [and] a process of the growth of Ukrainian national and state consciousness and the Ukrainianisation of state life as a consequence of this on the other – this is what characterises the present state of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. It does not fulfil the desires of the Ukrainian people to statehood; however, it is a *stage* on the way to the achievement of these hopes'.¹⁰³ Lozynskyi did not go into detail on what direction this path would lead. Although he did not explicitly say this, it does seem that on the basis of his analysis Ukrainian statehood could only finally be achieved outside the Soviet Union. The reference to the possible future usefulness of the clause on leaving the Soviet Union hints at this; so does the distinction between the Soviet regime and the developments taking place within the Soviet Ukrai-

¹⁰¹ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.4–7.

¹⁰² Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.7–9. The quotation is on p.8.

¹⁰³ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.9.

ne: the prediction that the latter would outgrow the former could be understood as a prediction of the end of Bolshevik rule.

Lozynskyi dealt with the developments in the Soviet Ukraine only as a form of introduction to the pamphlet. As one can see from its title, the focus of the work was the west Ukrainian lands under Poland and their task in creating a Ukrainian state. Throughout the pamphlet he defended the line taken by the ZUNR government. He supported the efforts to create a west Ukrainian state as a interim stage towards the achievement of the unity of the Ukraine¹⁰⁴ and attacked those in the Ukrainian National Labour Party who hoped to achieve autonomy within the Polish state.¹⁰⁵ He described the post of president of the Ukrainian National Council, held by Petrushevych, as an important link to the previous forms of statehood in the west Ukrainian lands and he warned against excessive criticism of the west Ukrainian government, which he believed in the conditions of struggle under which Ukrainians now found themselves detracted from the very idea of west Ukrainian statehood. One might read some dissatisfaction with Petrushevych into the claim that ‘it is sometimes even necessary to serve silently under wanting people out of respect for the institutions which are connected with their name and activity, and not destroy these institutions because one does not like the people who are connected with them’.¹⁰⁶ Despite this possible criticism of the ZUNR dictator the overall impression of *Z novym rokom* is that Lozynskyi was still loyal to Petrushevych and the ZUNR; he summed up his analysis on the west Ukrainian government with the statement that ‘the leading political line was correct’.¹⁰⁷

According to his autobiography, Lozynskyi’s break with Petrushevych took place at the end of 1924 and was a result of Petrushevych’s fear that Lozynskyi’s efforts to create an organisation of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians in eastern Galicia were an attempt to undermine his presidential authority. The grounds for the split may well have been purely personal, for both men continued to follow a pro-Soviet line. Indeed, Lozynskyi’s Sovietophilism strengthened and he started thinking about immigrating to the Ukraine.¹⁰⁸ As can be seen from the spending plans of the Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for 1925/6, Lozynskyi was receiving funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government for his activities as a propagandist in the European press.¹⁰⁹ At about this time Lozynskyi must have suggested setting up his own pro-Soviet political centre of west Ukrainian émigrés, because at a meeting of 26th February 1925 the Politburo rejected this proposal.¹¹⁰ The Bolsheviks were against the creation of any organisation that might exhibit even a trace of independence. They also clearly believed that Lozynskyi was much more use to them in emigration than in the Soviet Ukraine. In August 1925 the Politburo turned down Lozynskyi’s application to enter the Soviet Republic.¹¹¹ In September of that year Lozynskyi met the Soviet representative in Prague Antin

¹⁰⁴ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.17–8.

¹⁰⁵ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.21–35.

¹⁰⁶ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, pp.58, 60–5, 74–5. The quotation is on p.75.

¹⁰⁷ Lozynskyi, *Z novym rokom*, p.58.

¹⁰⁸ Rublov, ‘Shliakhamy na Solovky’, 1997, No.4, p.128.

¹⁰⁹ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.202.

¹¹⁰ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.156.

¹¹¹ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.1 ark.222.

Prykhodko. According to the Ukrainian plenipotentiary, Lozynskyi approached him with a request for further funding. Prykhodko demanded the same condition that he had required of Petrushevych, an open admission of support for the Soviet system. Prykhodko reminded the Politburo of Lozynskyi's articles for the German and French press describing the Polish abuse of the national minorities in their country. Prykhodko considered this work useful and was in favour of continuing the funding to Lozynskyi. The two men discussed whether Lozynskyi should join the UNDO, presumably with the intention of strengthening the Sovietophile element emerging within the party, but decided it was not a good idea.¹¹² Another meeting with Kaliuzhnyi took place in 1926, and in autumn of that year, Lozynskyi took part in a conference in Vienna where he called for the unification of eastern Galicia with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.¹¹³

Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist (Comments on Ukrainian statehood), which was published in 1927, may well have been the open declaration of Sovietophilism which Prykhodko demanded. In the pamphlet Lozynskyi proclaimed: 'The Derussification and Ukrainianisation of the state and social life in the Ukraine are nearing completion. More and more, rapprochement, mutual understanding and cooperation between the regime and society are developing. A broad circle of *Ukrainian Soviet Intelligentsia*, which stand on the position that the Soviet regime corresponds best to the national and state interests of the Ukraine, is now being created'. According to Lozynskyi the majority of the leaders and groups which supported the Central Rada and the initial period of the Directory were now for Ukrainian Soviet statehood. He pointed to Hrushevksyi, Vynnychenko and other leaders of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries who were all either serving in the party or in the Soviet intelligentsia. In doing so they 'connect[ed] the traditions of the Ukrainian national movement with the Ukrainian Soviet state': 'The extraordinary development of Ukrainian intellectual culture, of literature, science and art, is marked against the background of the general consolidation of the state and social life of the Ukraine. In short, the Soviet Ukraine will become the national and state centre of all the Ukrainian lands, the basis for the realisation of a United Ukrainian statehood'.¹¹⁴ Thus many of the questions which for Lozynskyi had been open in 1924, namely the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, its relationship with Russia and its national character, were now being answered, mainly as a result of the achievements of Ukrainianisation.

However, in *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist* Lozynskyi explored new areas, for example the nature of the revolution in eastern Ukraine. He argued that Russia and the Ukraine formed a single revolutionary unit because the weakness of Ukrainian national development had meant that many of the key social classes, for example the urban proletariat, in the Ukraine were Russian or Russified. Thus all of the governments of the Ukraine turned to Russian governments or foreign powers who were interested in restoring the old Russia: for example, whereas Skoropadskyi aimed for the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, the Directory sought help from the Entente, which also

¹¹² TsDAHO f.1 op.1 spr.147 ark.252–3.

¹¹³ Rublov, 'Shliakhmy na Solovky', 1997, No.4, pp.127–8. As can be seen from the above, Lozynskyi's description in the autobiography of his work for the Soviets in emigration tallies with the information from the former party archives.

¹¹⁴ Mykhailo Lozynskyi, *Uvahy pro Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, Vienna: Iednist, 1927, pp.4–5.

hoped to recreate a one and indivisible Russia.¹¹⁵ Equally, the left turned to the Bolsheviks. However, the difference was that all other Russian parties or foreign powers were in favour of restoring the unity of the old Russia; in contrast, ‘the Bolsheviks alone proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination up to separation’ and sought ‘the destruction of those classes on which the Russian domination of the Ukraine rested’. In this way, ‘the Bolsheviks were the natural ally of the Ukraine in its struggle for statehood’. The Bolsheviks aimed to create their conception of statehood on the entire territory of the former Russian empire, which was a single revolutionary unit. As a result, a Ukrainian Bolshevik government was set up in Kharkiv, leading to war with the Central Rada in Kyiv: ‘this in principle was a civil war between two governments of the same country’.¹¹⁶ It was only as a result of the peculiarities of the Ukraine’s historical development that this seemed to be a war between Russia and the Ukraine: for example the Bolsheviks relied on the support of the Russified proletariat; this had been necessary at that time because the process by which the Ukrainian left began to turn to Bolshevism only began later.¹¹⁷ Returning to the point that Russia and the Ukraine formed one revolutionary unit, Lozynskyi saw a further cause for the war in the Ukraine in the fact that the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the Whites, fought on Ukrainian territory. Indeed, by working with the Entente, the Directory had created a base for the all-Russian, anti-Bolshevik struggle. Consequently, the collapse of Bolshevism in the Ukraine would not have meant a strengthening of the Directory, but rather the triumph of Russian reaction.¹¹⁸

A major problem for all Ukrainian Sovietophiles when discussing the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to explain the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine. Lozynskyi dealt with this thorny issue by arguing that the constituent parts of the Soviet Union were sovereign because they had entered freely into the Union and had the right to leave it. This right to leave the Soviet Union not only underlined the sovereignty of the Soviet Republics; it also gave the constitution the character of an international treaty. According to this treaty, the different states transferred the execution of a part of their sovereign rights to the Union level.¹¹⁹ Thus, the Ukraine and Russia were two equal powers, independent of each other, and sharing equal rights on the basis of the Soviet Constitution. Lozynskyi recognised that some might say that this was a purely juridical answer, and that in reality Russia might have more power, making the Ukraine dependent upon it. Lozynskyi’s response to this argument was that elsewhere small, legally independent states were politically dependent on larger ones; the relationship between the Little Entente and France and Britain was just one example. If the Ukraine was not Soviet, it might be a democratic, legally independent state belonging to the League of Nations, but its legal independence would not preserve it from dependence on other powers. The political relationship between Russia and the Ukraine in the Soviet Union was not something permanent and unchanging, but rather subject to a contingent relationship of forces. One should therefore not speak of the dependence of the Ukraine on Russia, but rather the excessive power of the Russian element in the whole Union.

¹¹⁵ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.9–12.

¹¹⁶ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.12.

¹¹⁷ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.12–3.

¹¹⁸ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.14.

¹¹⁹ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.16.

Moreover, because the Ukraine was still suffering under the legacy of tsarist rule, any evolution could only go in the favour of the Ukraine, especially if she could unite all of the Ukrainian lands. The Ukraine must be in the position to execute her sovereignty to its greatest extent, and the size of her territory, natural wealth, population and geographical position gave her a good basis from which to achieve this.¹²⁰ Lozynskyi also argued that there was a general tendency towards closer state unions. At the same time, state sovereignty was acquiring a more formal, relative character. Mutual dependence and the creation of unions could be seen in the idea of a pan-European state, of pan-Americanism in South America and the British union of powers. The Soviet Union was merely a higher form of international development which the rest of Europe would at some point have to follow. Lozynskyi asked therefore why the Ukraine should want to leave the Soviet Union. Isolation from other powers would be impossible: the Ukraine would only find herself in a Union of bourgeois European states.¹²¹

The national character of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic lay 'in its foundations and in the direction of its development'. Its power was based on the popular masses, and therefore in the interests of self-preservation, the state must meet their material and spiritual needs. The destruction of the old Russified landed aristocracy and bourgeois and the redistribution of land to the peasantry and the organisation of trade and industry along new principles, which made the popular masses the chief agent within them, increased the power of the popular masses. Because this class in the Ukraine was overwhelmingly Ukrainian, the state, too, must become Ukrainian; the de-Russification and Ukrainianisation of society would have to take place. Only the Bolsheviks could have destroyed the Russian ruling caste; if the Directory had remained in power the Entente would have forced them to make concessions to the privileges of non-Ukrainians.¹²² As Lozynskyi argued, in 'striving towards its *social* aims, the revolution helped the subjugated peoples of Russia achieve their *national* aims'.¹²³ A further development which Lozynskyi could point to was that of Ukrainianisation. Lozynskyi rejected the arguments of Ukrainian critics of Ukrainianisation that it was slow, artificial and opposed by the Soviet bureaucracy. The cause of these difficulties lay, argued Lozynskyi, in the extreme level of Russification of Ukrainian society before the revolution which required a long time to be overcome. A whole generation must go to Ukrainian schools before this could be achieved. The only way to speed up the process was to work with the Soviet regime. The more educated Ukrainians did so, the quicker this de-Russification would take place. Lozynskyi sidestepped the argument that Ukrainianisation was a 'spontaneous' process arising out of the popular masses and not the policies of the ruling party to which the Soviet regime had to make concessions. He agreed that it was 'spontaneous' and added that this was the origin of its strength and the guarantee of its success. He warned against ignoring the role played by the Soviet government, which met it, supported, removed barriers to it and gave it state sanction – 'in a word, playing a leading role in it'. In this way, the Soviet regime took a 'spontaneous' process and turned it into a state-building element.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.20–4.

¹²¹ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.23.

¹²² Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.17–8.

¹²³ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.15.

¹²⁴ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.18–9.

Summing up at the end of the pamphlet, Lozynskyi wrote that the Soviet Union had been accused of a whole range of deficiencies. He admitted that ‘no-one denies these deficiencies’, but pointed out that ‘the Soviet press writes about them, [and] the Soviet regime tries to remove them’. He reminded the reader of the 250 year gap in Ukrainian state-building and added that what was taking place in the Ukraine was ‘a beginning, and not the completion of the construction of Ukrainian statehood’.¹²⁵ This statement in itself does not contradict Lozynskyi’s opening claim that the processes of de-Russification and Ukrainianisation were nearing completion: obviously these two developments were only a stage towards the development of Ukrainian statehood; indeed, in the text it is followed by the prediction that the Ukraine *will* become the national and state centre. More problematic for the coherency of Lozynskyi’s argument is his claim at the beginning of the pamphlet that de-Russification and Ukrainianisation were nearing completion and his forecast later on that Russification would require a whole generation to overcome. Lozynskyi had worked himself into a corner by his bombastic statement in favour of the Soviet Ukraine and his attempts to sidestep criticism.

Lozynskyi highlighted above all the basis which the Soviet Ukrainian state provided for the future work in building a united Ukraine.¹²⁶ He argued that the Soviet Ukraine gave those Ukrainians living in the west Ukrainian lands a clear goal and path in their struggle for liberation.¹²⁷ The emancipation of these territories from foreign rule was a matter for the whole of the Ukraine, because ‘the west Ukrainian lands can not free themselves from Poland only with their own forces’.¹²⁸ These areas could only be freed through the weakening of Poland and the strengthening of the Soviet Ukraine. The west Ukrainian lands had to work to undermine Poland from the inside. Moreover, all of the Ukrainians living in the west Ukrainian lands had to begin looking towards the Soviet Ukraine as this would deprive people like Levytskyi and Skoropadskyi of the right to depict themselves as the true Ukraine, thereby robbing Poland of its ability to present itself as the guardian of Kyiv. In turn this would weaken Polish and Rumanian imperialism and European hopes of intervention in the Ukraine, forcing it to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ukraine. He stressed that the non-aggression pact with Poland and the acknowledgement of Poland’s possession of the west Ukrainian lands in the Treaty of Riga did not amount to a proclamation of the Soviet Ukraine’s lack of interest in the west Ukrainian territories. At the time of the Treaty of Riga both the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ukraine were too weak to help the western Ukrainians.¹²⁹ However, the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had protested against the March Decision and Polish oppression. Indeed, the Treaty of Riga, in guaranteeing the rights of Ukrainians and Belorussians within Poland, gave the Soviet Union a diplomatic means by which to protest against infringements of these rights. Lozynskyi ruled out war for the time being, blaming the UNDO for creating a situation in which the Soviet Ukraine was seen as a foreign force and thereby weakening it in relation to the west Ukrainian lands. However, the non-aggression pact with the Ukraine was only valid as long as conditions made it worthwhile. Though the liberation of the west

¹²⁵ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.84.

¹²⁶ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.84.

¹²⁷ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.5.

¹²⁸ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.44.

¹²⁹ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.44–6.

Ukrainian lands could only take place through the strengthening of the Soviet Union, Lozynskyi warned against passivity among the Ukrainians living under Poland and Rumania. They should prepare the ground, strengthening their own forces, undermining Polish and Rumanian imperialism and creating a wall through which the Soviet Ukraine could not be attacked. Equally the Soviet Ukraine must support their brothers beyond their borders and establish links with them.¹³⁰

The pamphlet also stressed how the social goals of the Soviet Union could only benefit those Ukrainians living under Poland and Rumania. According to Lozynskyi, 'those classes against which the Soviet regime turned are foreign to the west Ukrainian lands'. By removing the foreign ruling class in Galicia, the Soviet regime would free the Ukrainian nation from both social and national oppression.¹³¹ The Ukrainians in the west Ukrainian lands were peasants, workers and members of the labouring intelligentsia. The first would gain land from the Soviet regime, the second control of the factories, and the third, the opportunity to work in all levels of state and social construction. These three classes would be the basis of the new state order and become the bearers of Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainianisation would replace Polonification, the Ukrainian language would become the state language and Ukrainian culture would have the right to free development. 'Whatever one's position towards Ukrainian Soviet statehood', claimed Lozynskyi, if the unification of the west Ukrainian lands were to bring about these national achievements, which parties like the UNDO also wanted, then one should do all in one's power to bring this about.¹³²

Indeed, Lozynskyi severely criticised the ideology and policies of other west Ukrainian parties. The UNDO was his main target. Its claim to represent a 'pure national-state ideal' against the class-based Soviet order was criticised by Lozynskyi for being itself an expression of the UNDO's own class interests.¹³³ He condemned the idea of the united national front, and the desire to put nation and state above party and class thus: 'Every group obviously maintains that it represents the interests of the nation and the state and that all other groups must subordinate themselves to it [and] create a united national front under its leadership. In order that they themselves are not subordinated, they claim that only they represent "the pure national state ideal"'.¹³⁴ It was wrong to deny that the Soviet Ukraine was a Ukrainian state because it was Communist; this, he said, echoed the Ukrainian politician who said that unless the Ukraine is social-democratic, it is not the Ukraine. Other countries had undergone changes in state form, had been absolute monarchies or democratic republics at different points in their history; 'is it possible to deny them the character of a national state?' Lozynskyi asked.¹³⁵ The attack on socialism as being an internationalist doctrine was for him based on an important misunderstanding. Democracy was as much an internationalist idea as that of socialism. If Ukrainian democratic groups think that democratic republics are automatically national, and socialist ones international, then this is only because democracy has so taken root on national ground that no-one notices its international character anymore.

¹³⁰ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.56–9.

¹³¹ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.59.

¹³² Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.59–60.

¹³³ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.50–1.

¹³⁴ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.80.

¹³⁵ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, p.81.

He offered Christianity as another internationalist idea that had become nationalised. Indeed, he claimed ‘every idea is internationalist’, even fascism: all of these ideas, when ‘planted on a national ground, will give a specific variation, which becomes the property of the national culture’.¹³⁶ Denying the Soviet Ukraine of the status as a national state had a number of dangers. Although the UNDO did not explicitly follow a policy of conciliation towards Poland, by denying the Ukrainian character of the Ukrainian SSR, it ‘contributes to the spread and strengthening of a conciliatory mood among Ukrainian society’. By claiming that the only way to bring about a Ukrainian state was through the collapse of the Soviet Union, it in fact justified Poland’s policy against the Soviet Ukraine. It puts liberation for the west Ukrainian lands so far in the future that most Ukrainians would prefer to seek a compromise with Poland.¹³⁷ The idea of western Ukraine freeing itself through its ‘own forces’ falsely categorised the Ukrainian SSR as ‘foreign’, while also helping Poland, which knew that the west Ukrainian lands could not achieve this on their own.¹³⁸ This was only one of the accusations levelled at the UNDO. Lozynskyi felt the UNDO’s criticisms of the Soviet Ukraine to be unfounded. The Soviet land solution should actually please the members of the UNDO because they claimed to expose the redistribution of land to the small peasants without compensation. The collective state was the only way of solving the land problem. He saw the same inconsistency in the UNDO’s critique of Soviet industry.¹³⁹

Lozynskyi’s writings were primarily concerned with the attainment of a united Ukrainian state. From 1924, he increasingly saw the Soviet Ukraine as the basis for this state. Though Lozynskyi presented the Soviet Ukraine as a useful ally against the Poles, he did so because he believed that as a result of Ukrainianisation the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was becoming truly Ukrainian; his geopolitical orientation towards the East was not despite the Bolsheviks’ policies in the Ukraine, but rather because of them.

In autumn 1926 Lozynskyi had again applied to immigrate to the Ukraine, at the height of the policy of Ukrainianisation. This request was granted and in September Lozynskyi travelled to Kharkiv. His sons had already gone to the Soviet Ukrainian capital and his wife followed him the next year.¹⁴⁰ He settled in Kharkiv where he chaired the law department at the Institute of National Economy and worked at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Lozynskyi’s fate was bound to the policy of Ukrainianisation which had brought him to the Soviet Ukraine and he became a victim of Moscow’s efforts to restrict the policy. In 1930, he was deported to the Northern Urals and shot in 1937 for his alleged participation in a ‘conspiracy’ against the Soviet Union.

Iuliian Bachynskyi

Iuliian Bachynskyi was a founding member of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. He belonged to the Social-Democratic wing of the party and in 1899 was one of those who left the Radicals to form the USDP. He has gone down in Ukrainian history as the first proponent of an independent Ukrainian state in his seminal text *Ukraina irredenta*,

¹³⁶ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.82–3.

¹³⁷ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.54–5.

¹³⁸ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.55–6.

¹³⁹ Lozynskyi, *Ukrainsku derzhavnist*, pp.52–3.

¹⁴⁰ Rublov, ‘Shliakhmy na Solovky’, 1997, No.4, p.108.

published in 1895/6. Consequently, Ukrainian writers have been at a loss to explain why this supposed prophet of Ukrainian independence defended the Soviet Ukraine's federal relationship with Russia in the mid-1920s and immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s. For this reason Ukrainian historians have sought to reject the label of Sovietophilism, either by claiming Bachynskyi was actually an opponent of the Bolsheviks or writing off his support as 'pragmatic'.¹⁴¹ However, this apparent inconstancy between Bachynskyi's pre- and post-war thought is merely the product of a misunderstanding of *Ukraina irredenta*.

As Kerstin Jobst has convincingly argued in her analysis of *Ukraina irredenta*, Bachynskyi must be understood as a Marxist thinker, not a nationalist. In *Ukraina irredenta* Bachynskyi rejected the idea of a romantic resurrection of the Ukrainian nation; instead, he defended the formation of national structures not on the basis of historical or linguistic rights but rather on a Marxist analysis of economic relations: he argued that the national struggles were only a cover for conflicts between different groups of bourgeoisie. Thus the debate about the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy was a conflict between the German bourgeoisie, who supported centralism in order to take advantage of the resources of the subjugated nations, and the Slavic bourgeoisie, who were proponents of federalism as a means of protecting themselves from the Germans. According to Bachynskyi, Social Democrats should support a federal and democratic reorganisation of the monarchy because this would remove the national conflicts which hindered the introduction of their social principles. Consequently, the Ukrainian SDs should campaign alongside the Polish petty bourgeoisie and workers for an extension of the franchise. They should also campaign for the federalisation of the monarchy, not on the basis of the crown lands, but rather on that of nationality – this would mean a Ukrainian federal unit made of eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Sub-Carpathia and the Lemko region. It was only for that part of the Ukraine which was ruled by Russia that Bachynskyi advocated the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Again he based this not on the particularity of the Ukrainian nation, but rather on the conflict between Russian, Polish and Ukrainian capitalism within the Russian empire. However, following Marx and Engels, Bachynskyi believed that with the development of international capitalism the state would become meaningless: capitalism would undergo a general crisis of overproduction and the intensification of class antagonisms, the only solution to which would be the replacement of nation states with an international organisation which would coordinate production and distribution. The Ukrainian nation state about which Bachynskyi wrote was therefore only a transitional phase on the path towards socialism. Indeed, the different nationalities would also disappear. With the development of the international centre 'each and every nation will denationalise. National particularities, which until then characterised the nation and distinguished them from others, will begin to disappear more and more. In the end, civilised societies will be so similar that they will merge into a single anthropological-cultural type'. Though it is quite possible that Bachynskyi rejected independence for the Habsburg Ukrainian lands out of expediency, it is clear that he did not see the nation state as a good in itself, but rather a means of

¹⁴¹ O.I. Saltovskiy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti*, p.289; Benei, *Iuliiian Bachynskiy*, p.53.

achieving socialism.¹⁴² In this light Bachynskyi's later Sovietophilism is less of a break with his pre-war thinking than has been thought.

During the First World War Bachynskyi served in the Austro-Hungarian army; in October 1918 he joined the Ukrainian National Council which set up the ZUNR in November. Following the unification of the ZUNR and UNR Bachynskyi was appointed head of the UNR's mission to the USA on the recommendation of the ZUNR's foreign minister. By June 1921 it was clear that the purpose of the mission had failed because the USA continued to refuse to recognise the UNR. The UNR government ordered the mission to move to Vienna. On arriving in the Austrian capital he ceased to work for the UNR and became a member of the ZUNR's diplomatic mission. In 1923 he moved to Berlin, where he spent the next ten years. Like many other Ukrainian émigrés at the time, Bachynskyi seems to have maintained links to groups from different political spectrums of the emigration. In Austria these included Hrushevskyi and Social Democrats like Oles Kandyba and Volodymyr Levynskyi, who all adopted Sovietophile positions; in Germany he seems to have taken part in meetings with German figures interested in the Ukrainian question alongside the leaders of the UVO. According to Behei in summer 1924 he was present at a conference in Königsburg at which an agreement was made for a joint German-UVO attack on Poland. During the period of ideological flux at the beginning of the 1920s such different contacts do not seem to have been anything unusual. In 1925, however, Bachynskyi broke with Konovalts. He wrote to *Ukrainskyi prapor* condemning the program of the UNDO, which had been written by an UVO member, and defending the Soviet Ukraine as beneficial to Ukrainian national interests.¹⁴³ This article, 'Na rozstainii dorozh' was published in the same year alongside another, 'Pohovorim raz na rozum!' in a pamphlet entitled *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi*.¹⁴⁴ Three years later the book was reissued, this time with four more articles ('Bolshevizm i zakhidna-ukrainska sprava', 'Viina UNDO z Ukrainskoho Radianskoho Respublikoiu', 'Natsionalna ukrainsko-rosiiska problema n KPbU' and 'Desiatylittia bolshevytskoi revoliutsii'), published in 1926 and 1927.¹⁴⁵ The arguments of these different articles remained consistent and they may be treated together.

In *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi* Bachynskyi argued that the Bolsheviks had had two aims: the first to overthrow the old order, the second to build socialism. The first of these goals had been successful. Only the Bolsheviks could bring down the tsars as this had required a left-wing movement as extreme as the right-wing regime of the Romanovs had been. However, the Bolsheviks had not achieved their second objective. In an article assessing the first ten years of Bolshevik rule he asked rhetorically whether it was possible to expect a country which was behind all the other countries of the capitalist world in terms of the development of capitalism, the state and culture to make the

¹⁴² Kerstin S. Jobst, 'Marxismus und Nationalismus: Julijan Bačyns'kyj und die Rezeption seiner "Ukraina irredenta" (1895/96) als Konzept der ukrainischen Unabhängigkeit?', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol.47, 1997, No.1, pp.31–47. The quotation is on p.39. For a detailed summary of the contents of the *Ukraina irredenta*, see Saltovskiy, *Kontseptsii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti*, Kyiv: Parpapan, 2002. This account should, however, be treated with caution as the author sees Bachynskyi as a nationalist thinker.

¹⁴³ Behei, *Bachynskyi*, pp.41–5, 48–9.

¹⁴⁴ Iulian Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi. Krytychni zamitky*, Berlin: Ukrainskyi Prapor, 1925.

¹⁴⁵ Iulian Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi. Krytychni zamitky*, Berlin: published at the author's expense, 1928. The following references refer to this version of the text.

transition to socialism. The Bolsheviks had only been able to socialise the means of production in the cities; they had had to introduce the New Economic Policy, which left agriculture in private hands. He even seemed to think that further concessions to capitalism were possible. Bachynskyi denied that the time for the international revolution had arrived. In order to prove this he claimed that the Third International had adopted the same stance once held by the Second International, and that in turn the Second International was moving closer to the ruling classes. For the same reason, the USSR was seeking to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalist countries. On these grounds Bachynskyi characterised the Russian revolution as 'not socialist, but capitalist': 'The Russian revolution is gradually approaching its culmination, that is... a democratic, bourgeois order'. Bachynskyi argued that all who believed in such an order should help in the Bolshevik task of state building, in order to promote the evolution of the Bolshevik regime. He therefore condemned military intervention in the Soviet Republics. A victory for Bolshevism would be followed by a punitive Red terror, whereas if the opponents of Bolshevism won, the old reactionary order would be restored.¹⁴⁶ Clearly, either way the developments which Bachynskyi described would be interrupted. Bachynskyi's appeal to supporters of the bourgeois democratic state may have been intended for the readership of *Ukrainskyi prapor*, in which the original article appeared. However, his defence of the bourgeois state was not a departure from his pre-war views. In *Ukrainska irredenta*, too, Bachynskyi had advocated the creation of such a state as a prerequisite for the implementation of socialism. Bachynskyi may have hailed the Russian revolution as a capitalist revolution, but he could do so for orthodox Marxist reasons: as a stage towards the achievement of socialism.

Bachynskyi also disagreed with opponents of Bolshevism on the national character of the Communist party. The Bolshevik revolution, he wrote, 'does not have anything in common with the "Muscovite" national psyche'. Bachynskyi stressed the leading role played by non-Russians in the Bolshevik party. Not only did he point to the Jews, Poles and Georgians in the leadership of the Bolsheviks; he also argued that Lenin was of Tatar origin. In contrast, the 'Muscovites', gathered together in the White movement, had fought against Bolshevism.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, Bachynskyi saw the Bolshevik revolution 'as a spasmodic cry of pain from the abused and oppressed peoples of Russia'.¹⁴⁸ The Central Rada had not aspired to independence, but rather towards territorial autonomy within Russia. Consequently, the desire of the subjected nations towards freedom expressed itself in enthusiasm for Bolshevism, despite the fact that it was primarily interested in introducing socialism, because the methods of creating socialism which it advocated were the most revolutionary and therefore the best tool in the non-Russians' struggle for liberation. Whereas other Russian parties only struggled against the tsarist regime, the Bolsheviks fought to overthrow Russia itself. Evidence for this was to be found in the fact that the Bolsheviks had replaced the name 'Russia' with that of the USSR, declared the right of national self-determination up to independence and created a federation of national republics.¹⁴⁹ Bachynskyi stressed that only under the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat could the Russified bourgeoisie and aristocracy in the

¹⁴⁶ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.27–8, 52, 120–2. The quotations are on p.27.

¹⁴⁷ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.41–3. The quotation is on p.41.

¹⁴⁸ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.43.

¹⁴⁹ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.44–5.

Ukraine, which had in the past hindered the achievement of Ukrainian national goals, be swept away.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, the weakness of national consciousness in the Ukraine meant that the country could not acquire statehood on its own account. This was what he meant when he claimed that it was ‘necessary to organise the Ukrainian state without Ukrainians and without the Ukrainian language’: the rural population, which spoke Ukrainian, was only interested in acquiring land and not in state-building; and the urban population, which was the group capable of creating such a state, did not speak Ukrainian. Only the Bolsheviks, by proclaiming the rights of nations to self-determination, could overcome these hurdles and achieve that which the Ukrainians were not in a position to do.¹⁵¹

Ukrainianisation was therefore a natural product of the non-Russian Bolshevik revolution and Bachynskyi defended the policy against its detractors. He claimed that Ukrainianisation was being introduced at all levels of the education system and the administration, including the highest organs of power. In response to the claim by the UNDO that Ukrainianisation was not aimed at strengthening the Ukrainian nation politically, Bachynskyi asked the following rhetorical questions: ‘But what does it mean when all laws in the Ukraine are adopted and proclaimed by the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviet Deputies in the name of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and in all schools, beginning with the lowest, the young learn that they study in the schools of the Ukrainian Republic and live in the Ukrainian Republic? Does not such an education of the young, growing Ukrainian generation in an atmosphere of Ukrainian statehood and the continuation of Ukrainianisation in all administrative-state institutions strengthen the Ukrainian nation politically?’¹⁵² Above all, Bachynskyi praised how this changed the way in which Ukrainians saw themselves. As a result of Ukrainianisation, Ukrainian workers and peasants ‘are now beginning to feel that they are not just individuals, each to his own, but rather also one community – a people, and they see that the state in which they live is their state’.¹⁵³ Yet Bachynskyi did not only stress the national achievements of Ukrainianisation. The Ukrainian labouring masses now had the opportunity to develop their own form of high culture, which up to that point had only expressed the ideology of the bourgeoisie. He accepted that for some representatives of bourgeois culture this might seem like a destruction of culture. Against this he argued that bourgeois culture had not been eternal, but rather the expression of a particular phase of general human development. Likewise, proletarian culture represented the next phase of human development.¹⁵⁴

Because of the claim that the Ukrainian state truly was Ukrainian, Bachynskyi had to counter the suggestion that the federal structure of the Soviet Union impinged on the sovereignty of the Ukraine. He argued that all four national republics of the Soviet Union ran their own internal affairs. He admitted that they did so in a similar way, but pointed out that the reason for this was that they all accepted the same basic principle of socialism. Equally, all capitalist countries ran their affairs in a similar way, because they had in common their adherence to the principle of capitalism. The fact that there were

¹⁵⁰ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.64–5.

¹⁵¹ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.50, 81, 130. The quotation is on p.130.

¹⁵² Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.21–2, 38–40. The quotation is on p.22.

¹⁵³ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.133.

¹⁵⁴ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.123–5.

areas which were not in the hands of the republics did not mean that the sovereignty of the individual republics was in any way reduced. All the republics had their representatives at the union level, and each of these had equal rights. Therefore Moscow did not occupy a leading position in the federation for without the agreement of the other national republics, it could do nothing. Naturally, there were disagreements between republics. The fact that Russia sometimes emerged triumphant from these did not mean that the Ukraine was not sovereign, but rather that Russia's arguments in this case had been stronger. Bachynskyi saw this as a product of the centuries of state experience which the Russians had but which the non-Russians lacked. Indeed, he felt that if one argued that the federal structure of the USSR detracted from the sovereignty of the individual republics, one could perfectly well argue that the other Soviet republics, including the Russian, were not sovereign. Bachynskyi compared this structure to the relationship between Austria and Hungary under the Habsburgs.¹⁵⁵ It was especially significant for Bachynskyi that the Soviet Republics possessed the right to leave the Union. Here there does seem to have been some sort of development in Bachynskyi's views. In his article from 1925 he stressed that this right was only of theoretical importance, at least for the time being. Nevertheless, the fact that it was in the constitution of the USSR was a sign that the liberation of the non-Russian peoples was 'one of the main, fundamental principles of the Bolshevik revolution, showing [its] end and foundation'.¹⁵⁶ However, only a year later, Bachynskyi did not say that the right was only theoretical, but rather pointed out that neither Austria nor Hungary had possessed such a right.¹⁵⁷

Bachynskyi also threw doubt on the sovereignty of supposedly independent Western states. He argued that in Western countries capitalism had advanced to the last stage of its development before the transition to socialism. The economic interests of these countries were so dependent on the interests of other states that their merger would be beneficial. East European countries were behind the West economically, and therefore each state regulated its own economy. However, Bachynskyi predicted that the East European countries would also have to merge in order to resist the West European Union. The Ukraine must enter this union as an independent and voluntary member. Given the backwardness of the country, only the structure of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would help her develop to this point.¹⁵⁸ Here, again, it is possible to see how the themes discussed in *Ukraina irredenta* appeared in Bachynskyi's post-war writings: independent states were not a goal in themselves, but rather the stages towards the achievement of an international federation of socialist states.

Bachynskyi dismissed criticism of the Bolsheviks by pointing to the importance of the task which they had undertaken. After calling on the emigration to return, he warned potential returnees thus: 'do not be disheartened by the mistakes and errors in one experiment; something is taking place which is not small, but rather complicated and great; hereto that new construction on a new socialist basis is being laid, to which, together with the "dictatorship of the proletariat", the Bolshevik revolution owes its victory and through which the Ukrainian people achieved the first requirements of their

¹⁵⁵ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.83–90.

¹⁵⁶ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.45.

¹⁵⁷ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.91.

¹⁵⁸ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.47–50.

national and state rebirth'.¹⁵⁹ He admitted that the Bolsheviks had dealt with their political opponents mercilessly, but recalled the fact that the recent world war had been much more merciless. Whereas the world war had been about strengthening capitalism and increasing the oppression of workers and peasants, the mercilessness of the Bolsheviks had been aimed at liberating the labouring masses and the subjected peoples.¹⁶⁰ Of course, such a willingness to ignore the brutality of the Bolsheviks for the good of the world socialist revolution was a common characteristic to most Sovietophiles. However, interestingly enough, even after Communist policy began to change to the detriment of Ukrainian interests, Bachynskyi continued to defend the Bolsheviks. During the Shumskyi affair, Bachynskyi naturally took the sides of Shumskyi. He criticised the leadership of the KP(b)U for attacking only the 'Ukrainian nationalist deviation' and not Great-Russian chauvinism, which it had also recognised as being a danger. Indeed, Bachynskyi argued that Shumskyi better represented Leninist teaching on the nationalities than did the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and was more appropriate for the Ukrainian population. He also suggested that the Central Committee had acted against Shumskyi because they feared that this tendency would grow stronger and stronger and he indicated that he himself believed that this would be the case.¹⁶¹ In the Shumskyi affair Bachynskyi certainly criticised the leadership of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. However, he did so from a Leninist standpoint in the hope that Shumskyi's understanding of the nationalities' policy would be adopted. Indeed, even after the Shumskyi affair, Bachynskyi wrote a very pro-Soviet assessment of the previous ten years of Bolshevik rule.¹⁶² Nevertheless, more research is needed on Bachynskyi's views in the late 1920s and the early 1930s to see how his views developed under the impact of the end of Ukrainianisation and introduction of collectivisation in the Ukraine. Especially important is the journal *Vilna trybuna* which Bachynskyi started editing in 1933 in Prague.

In the introduction to the 1928 edition of *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi* Bachynskyi had declared his intention 'to travel to the Soviet Ukraine and to the other Soviet republics in order to convince myself there on the spot to what extent that which I have written about the Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union in these articles corresponds to reality'. He also promised to write a further set of articles when he had seen for himself the situation in the country.¹⁶³ However, it was not until November 1933 that Bachynskyi finally entered the USSR. Bachynskyi spent most of his period in emigration in Berlin, but in March 1931 he travelled to Lviv. He was carrying with him 21 copies of *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i Ukraintsi*, which seems to have been the cause of his arrest by the Polish authorities. He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and after serving his punishment he returned to the German capital. In 1933 he began editing the monthly journal *Vilna trybuna*, but on 15th November he applied for a visa to the Soviet Union at the Soviet consulate in Prague. Ten days later he was already in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.¹⁶⁴ Here he worked on the editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia, but in 1934 he was arrested and imprisoned on the Solovets Islands.

¹⁵⁹ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.99–100.

¹⁶⁰ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.134–5.

¹⁶¹ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.103–13.

¹⁶² Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, pp.111–35.

¹⁶³ Bachynskyi, *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia*, p.3.

¹⁶⁴ Behei, *Bachynskyi*, pp.49, 51.

Antin Krushelnytskyi

Bachynskyi emigrated to the Ukraine after the Bolsheviks had begun to halt Ukrainianisation, brought a terrible famine on the Ukraine through requisitioning, dekulakisation and collectivisation, and purged elements of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and party and state apparatus. Without being able to see his work in 1933 for *Vilna trybuna* it is impossible to say how he accommodated his Sovietophilism to these events. However, the writings of Antin Krushelnytskyi in the Galician pro-Soviet journal *Novi shliakhy* do allow one to analyse the beliefs required to preserve one's Sovietophilism at a time when the Bolsheviks' policies caused many Sovietophiles to despair of the Soviet Union.

Antin Krushelnytskyi was an important Galician writer heavily influenced by West European modernism. Before the First World War he had worked alongside the Galician radical and writer Ivan Franko and played a prominent role in the Ukrainian Radical Party. In 1919 he joined the UNR cabinet as minister of education under Borys Martos. He then emigrated to Vienna where he was involved in the pro-UNR journal *Volia*. However, at the end of 1919 he and the east Ukrainian poet Oleksandr Oles left the paper to found their own journal *Na perelomi* (At the Turning Point). While working on *Na perelomi* Krushelnytskyi was still an opponent of the Bolsheviks, describing them in one article as wanting to resurrect the old ideas of a united Russia. However, elements of his later thought were already evident; for example he was highly critical of the older generation of Ukrainian leaders who had been equivocal in their desire to create an independent Ukrainian state.¹⁶⁵ Krushelnytskyi's opposition to the Bolsheviks gradually began to change. In September 1921 Krushelnytskyi was involved in a meeting between Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and the Soviet plenipotentiaries in Vienna on the publication and acquisition abroad of Ukrainian-language text books for Ukrainian schools.¹⁶⁶ By 1923 he was cooperating on the Sovietophile journal *Nova hromada*. The March Decision may have been an important moment in Krushelnytskyi's conversion to Sovietophilism; nevertheless, he had clearly begun to rethink his position on the Bolsheviks before 1923. Krushelnytskyi contributed a number of articles on the school system in various parts of the Ukraine to *Nova hromada*. He praised the Soviet Ukrainian school system because it had Ukrainianised not only the language of instruction, but also the content of the school curriculum.¹⁶⁷ In contrast, in Sub-Carpathian Rus he saw increasing Russification within the school system: a detrimental process which the Czechoslovak government was not interested in stopping.¹⁶⁸ He returned to Galicia in 1925, but was not able to take up his pre-war profession of teaching. Between 1929 and 1933 he edited the pro-Soviet journals *Novi shliakhy*, which received funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government,¹⁶⁹ and *Krytyka*. In 1934 he immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine.

Krushelnytskyi described one of the aims of *Novi shliakhy* as being 'to acquaint the reader with the achievements of the Soviet Ukraine in the realms of science and art'.¹⁷⁰ In

¹⁶⁵ *Na perelomi*, No.3, 1920, pp.5–11.

¹⁶⁶ TsDIA f.1235 op.1 spr.94 ark.24.

¹⁶⁷ *Nova hromada*, I, 1923, pp.54–75.

¹⁶⁸ *Nova hromada*, III–IV, 1923, pp.51–71.

¹⁶⁹ TsDAHO f.1 op.16 spr.7 ark.185.

¹⁷⁰ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, p.284.

addition to articles on this subject, *Novi shliakhy* also devoted much space to Galician politics. In particular, many articles attacked the mainstream Ukrainian nationalist party the UNDO and sought to defend the Soviet Union from charges made by the UNDO against it. Criticism of the Poles was, however, circumscribed and many articles had passages removed by the censor. Some were banned entirely.¹⁷¹

Krushelnytskyi's political writing during his period as editor of *Novi shliakhy* centred around the contrast between what he called 'romantic nationalism' and 'state nationalism'. By 'romantic nationalism' Krushelnytskyi understood the form of nationalism which had been current before the world war and which remained dominant in Galicia. He described this as 'the uncritical enthusiasm for the past...this is the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian songs, Ukrainian folk clothes, this is Ukrainian folk theatre, the Ukrainian (Greek-Catholic) church' and so on.¹⁷² As a result, the politics of the pre-war Ukrainian nationalists had been aimed towards the creation of Ukrainian schools or competition with the Poles for places in the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy. It was therefore above all cultural nationalism and Krushelnytskyi believed it was unable of creating a state: 'the field of state-building economics did not enter into the sphere of interest of Ukrainian romantic nationalism', which 'by its romantic nature' could not understand economics. Krushelnytskyi believed that this situation had not changed after 1918. He saw one slight difference in that east Galician nationalists lost interest in distant history. The tumultuous events of 1918, which they had experienced themselves, took a more important place in their national outlook: thus, for example, the Ukrainian Galician Army replaced the Cossack tradition in their affections.¹⁷³ However, this change was not accompanied by an increased interest in the role of the economic sphere, especially as national economic institutions such as the credit cooperatives passed out of the control of Ukrainian hands.¹⁷⁴ He concluded that whereas for nationalists 'under Austria it was enrapturing to wear embroidered shirts, now Ukrainian caps and tridents are enough for them and at most [the formation of] conspiratorial groups for not completely responsible acts'.¹⁷⁵ Because it remained beholden to this form of nationalism, west Ukrainian society denied that the Soviet Ukraine was anything more than a form of Muscovite occupation and called for intervention in order to overthrow the Soviet regime and establish a nation state more in keeping with its idea of the nation.¹⁷⁶ The error of this 'romantic nationalism' was to try to copy West European nationalism. For Krushelnytskyi Western nationalism was the nationalism of the bourgeoisie who set up colonies which they could exploit in order to maintain control over their own working class. Krushelnytskyi argued that it was ridiculous for the western Ukraine to attempt to imitate such a nationalism because it lacked its own bourgeoisie and was itself a colony of Poland. As a result it and its interventionist aspirations were nothing more than tools in the hands of the imperialist, bourgeois states.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ See for example Krushelnytskyi's article on the UNDO congress in *Novi shliakhy*, No.5, 1932, pp.105–52.

¹⁷² *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, p.281.

¹⁷³ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, pp.209–10.

¹⁷⁴ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, p.211.

¹⁷⁵ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, p.212.

¹⁷⁶ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, pp.208–9.

¹⁷⁷ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, pp.212–5.

The opposite of this was the form of nationalism to be found in the Soviet Ukraine. This was the nationalism of state-building. According to Krushelnytskyi, following the collapse of the Directory, the Ukraine began to experience a cultural renaissance which encompassed all areas of life. Through the establishment of Ukrainian universities and technical schools a new cadre of Soviet leaders was being created. Ukrainian culture in the form of literature, science, art and the press flourished.¹⁷⁸ However, he claimed that 'one must name the industrialisation of the Ukraine, both in industry and agriculture, and its decolonisation as the most important attributes of contemporary Ukraine'.¹⁷⁹ Before the revolution the Ukraine had been a provider of raw materials for Moscow. However, the Soviet regime liberated the Ukrainian economy from the domination of foreign capital and now all areas of industry were being developed. These included machine-building, metallurgy and chemicals; industries which a metropole normally does not tolerate emerging in its colonies. The construction of Dniprelstan, which had brought about the electrification of the Ukraine, was highlighted as a symbol of the rebuilding of the Ukrainian economy. In the realm of agriculture, two policies had been followed simultaneously: on the one hand, the private ownership of land had been strengthened; on the other, the foundations of a socialist organisation of the rural economy had been laid.¹⁸⁰ Krushelnytskyi believed that all of these developments would find completion in the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan, which would see the further improvement of industry and the final transition within agriculture to collectivisation.¹⁸¹

According to Krushelnytskyi the fundamental differences between romantic and state nationalism emanated from class differences. Although nationalism was a nation's aspiration towards the formation of itself in a state, a state was always the expression of the power of the ruling class within that nation. This meant that nationalism always had a class content. The October revolution and the creation of the Soviet Ukraine had created a state in the Ukraine which replaced the bourgeois understanding of the state with a socialist one by proclaiming 'all power to the proletariat!'. This new form of state expressed the will of the labouring masses, removed the bourgeoisie from power, freed oppressed nations from national chauvinism, subordinated all cultural values to the service of the workers and peasants and liberated the economy from the domination of foreign capital.¹⁸² Thus, in the Soviet Ukraine nationalism was 'formed on the social restructuring of the nation and state power'.¹⁸³ In comparison the western Ukraine had been returned to the situation which had existed before the war through the restoration of agricultural capitalism and the transfer of Ukrainian industry into the hands of international capital. The region was once again a colony of international capital. Thus, the upper classes had consolidated their position in order to protect themselves from the workers, peasants and labouring intelligentsia and to serve international capital. West Ukrainian nationalism was the expression of this consolidation.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, pp.283–4.

¹⁷⁹ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, p.219.

¹⁸⁰ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, pp.284–5; 7–8, p.219.

¹⁸¹ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, p.286.

¹⁸² *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, pp.220–1.

¹⁸³ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, p.222.

¹⁸⁴ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 7–8, p.222.

This critique was extended in Krushelnytskyi's review of the politics of the Galician political parties, which accounted for much of his political writing on the pages of *Novi shliakhy*. The UNDO especially came in for the most criticism, which is unsurprising given the fact that it was the dominant legal Ukrainian party in Poland and had adopted a decidedly anti-Soviet course after 1929. For Krushelnytskyi, the greatest sin of the Galician political parties was that they were conciliators and opportunists.¹⁸⁵ The reason for this was that they were 'UNRist'. By this he meant that they hoped to create a Ukraine independent of the Bolsheviks: an aim which for him always meant the recreation the Ukrainian People's Republic as envisaged by the Warsaw treaty of 1920 by invading the Ukrainian SSR with the aid of the Poles. Some parties, such as the UNDO, openly cooperated with the Poles. He admitted that other parties, for example the OUN, rejected the Warsaw treaty as such, but argued that as the only way to create a UNR Ukraine was through Warsaw, they were no less conciliatory than those who publicly worked with the Poles.¹⁸⁶ However, in the case of the UNDO their willingness to compromise with those in authority stretched back to the origins of the doctrine of which the party was an exponent, namely Ukrainian national democracy.¹⁸⁷ A further reason for his dislike of the UNDO and OUN was that he believed both parties to be infused with the principles of international Catholic clericalism. Consequently, as the bearers of an internationalist doctrine, they were not truly national parties, as could be seen by their willingness to work with Polish Catholicism.¹⁸⁸ Though Krushelnytskyi opposed clericalism from a national standpoint, he also did so from a socialist perspective. He believed that clericalism served capitalism by 'reconciling the labouring class to the subjugation of financial, industrial and agrarian capital'.¹⁸⁹ In this way, Krushelnytskyi sought to counter the claim made by the Galician parties that only they represented the Ukrainian nation and that the Soviet Ukraine was not national because it was founded on an international doctrine. Indeed, opposition to the Soviet Union deprived them of their claim to represent the national interest. He wrote of west Ukrainian nationalism that 'it rejects the Soviet Ukrainian reality, denies the right to all who do not go with them in the struggle against the Soviet Ukraine to talk of the nation. It forgets that their way to the UNR lies under the patronage of internationalist capitalism, to the overthrow of the Ukrainian SSR with all its achievements, to the political and economic subjugation of the *Ukrainian labouring masses* by international interventionist capital, even to the oppression of *Ukrainian national culture* on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR by the interventionists'.¹⁹⁰ Only Selrob, the Communist front organisation, was a truly nationalist organisation because it was orientated towards the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian state being created within it.¹⁹¹

The critique of 'romantic nationalism' also informed his commentary on the SVU trial. Krushelnytskyi believed the official Soviet account according to which those under trial belonged to a secret underground organisation called the Union for the Liberation of the

¹⁸⁵ *Novi, Shliakhy*, 1930, 4, pp.97–101.

¹⁸⁶ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 10, p.101.

¹⁸⁷ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 1, pp.65–109.

¹⁸⁸ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 10, pp.107–8.

¹⁸⁹ *Novi shliakhy*, 1931, 12, p.351.

¹⁹⁰ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, pp.109–110.

¹⁹¹ *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 10, p.109.

Ukraine (SVU) which had aimed to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union and to place the Ukraine under the imperialist yoke of foreign capital. He quoted the admissions made by the accused to prove that this was the case. He damned those standing trial as an 'internal Petliurite emigration', which like the emigration abroad was unable to reconcile itself to the Soviet Ukrainian state. Krushelnytskyi attacked those standing trial for the same failures he observed in the west Ukrainian romantic nationalists. He repeatedly accused them of being men of the past, calling them for example 'the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the old Russian type' or 'old, romantic Ukrainian figures'. Their understanding of the Ukraine was limited to folklore, popular literature, history and lexicography and at the beginning of the First World War their maximal demands had consisted of the creation of Ukrainian primary schools inside the Russian empire. During the revolution they had found the task of creating a Ukrainian state thrust upon them, and given their psychological incapability of understanding their task had failed. Following the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian republic, they had taken up cultural work in the Soviet Ukraine, but in doing so they remained removed from those peasants and workers doing political and 'real' work. Consequently, they could not see that their desires did not coincide with those of the rest of the Ukrainian nation.¹⁹²

Krushelnytskyi's treatment of the SVU trial and his uncritical acceptance of the Soviet accusations against the accused show how by the 1930s it was only possible for Ukrainian Sovietophiles to maintain their position if they followed the official Soviet line without question. Those Sovietophiles who had supported the Soviet Ukraine because of its apparent national achievements found it increasingly difficult to continue to do so after the attacks on those Ukrainians responsible for putting Ukrainianisation into practice. It was now impossible for Ukrainians to express critical support for the Bolsheviks. Only those willing to believe unconditionally remained. Krushelnytskyi's emphasis on economic state-building meant that the cultural accomplishments of Ukrainianisation were less important for him than the economic 'successes' promised by industrialisation and collectivisation; his Sovietophilism was perfectly suited to the period in which the Five Year Plans were replacing *korenizatsiia*. For this reason, Krushelnytskyi, who had been subject to persecution and arrest by the Polish authorities, immigrated with his family to the Soviet Ukraine in 1934, by which time many other Sovietophiles and even Communist supporters of Ukrainianisation had already been imprisoned or executed. However, the Krushelnytskyi family soon suffered the same fate as those whom Krushelnytskyi had damned in *Novi shliakhy*. He was sent with his wife to a prison camp, where he died in 1941; their two sons, Ivan and Taras, were executed.

Conclusion

Clearly, many east Galicians saw in the Bolsheviks, who had recently emerged from a war with the Polish Republic, a potentially useful ally who shared a common enemy. As early as March 1919 the ZUNR government under Petrushevych began to consider an alliance with the Bolsheviks. It was only rejected out of consideration for the Ukrainian People's Republic and a preference for a solution by the Entente. The split between the ZUNR and UNR removed the first impediment to a pro-Soviet orientation and Petrushevych's government increasingly cultivated links with the Soviet Ukrainian representa-

¹⁹² *Novi shliakhy*, 1930, 4, pp.286–91, 297.

tives abroad. However, he did so clandestinely because he still hoped to achieve the creation of an east Galician state with the help of the Entente. The Ambassadors' Decision in March removed any possibility of this and Petrushevych openly adopted a Sovietophile position. However, his courtship of the Bolsheviks forced Petrushevych to undergo an ideological 'turn to the left'; by 1927 even the Bolsheviks saw Petrushevych as politically sound. In the early 1920s some members of the Ukrainian Military Organisation also saw the Bolsheviks as a possible supporter in their struggle against the Poles. However, it seems that the group failed to receive funding from the Soviet Ukrainian government; by the end of the 1920s the UVO had rejected a pro-Soviet orientation. This might be an indication that the coincidence of geopolitical goals alone was not enough to underpin cooperation between the Soviet Ukraine and émigré Ukrainian nationalists.

Indeed, the Soviet authorities were constantly suspicious of the émigrés. In particular, they feared that those eastern Galicians who immigrated to the Soviet Ukraine could prove to be subversive, spreading nationalism among Ukrainians in the Soviet republic. Those who travelled to the Ukrainian SSR were therefore subject to rigorous checks. However, there were also doubts about supporting east Galician nationalists in the emigration and in Poland. Some of the Soviet Ukrainian plenipotentiaries, for example Mykhailo Levytskyi and Naum Kaliuzhnyi, were reluctant to give aid to Petrushevych. They distrusted his intentions and doubted his influence. Others, especially the Soviet Ukrainian representative in Berlin Volodymyr Aussem, were much more willing to support east Galician and émigré groups as a means of undermining Poland. This conflict mirrored the debates going on within the KP(b)U itself and no doubt also limited Soviet Ukrainian cooperation with east Galician Ukrainians.

Despite these conflicts within the KP(b)U, following the introduction of Ukrainianisation in 1923 the Soviet Ukraine became increasingly attractive for many eastern Galicians. A number of prominent east Galician intellectuals were converted to Sovietophilism. Their arguments did not appeal to geopolitical considerations, but rather argued that the Bolsheviks' social and national policies had benefited the Ukraine and would help the west Ukrainian lands. This was the case for both Lozynskyi and Bachynskyi. Lozynskyi started from the question of whether the Soviet Ukrainian Republic offered a suitable basis for the achievement of Ukrainian unity. Bachynskyi began with an analysis of the Bolsheviks' aims and achievements during the revolution. Despite these differences, they often used very similar arguments to support their Sovietophilism. Unsurprisingly, both stressed the sincerity of Ukrainianisation and the formal rights of the Soviet Ukraine as a Soviet republic; at the same time they argued that the developments in the Ukraine were incomplete and represented merely a stage towards greater achievements. Bachynskyi like Lozynskyi relativised the Soviet Ukraine's dependence on Moscow as a part of the Soviet Union by claiming that no state was truly independent of others. Another common argument was that the social policy of Bolshevism had benefited the Ukraine because in the Ukraine the classes which the Bolsheviks attacked were non-Ukrainian and were responsible for the Ukraine's national subjugation. Therefore, both Lozynskyi and Bachynskyi couched their support for the Soviet Ukraine in national terms. There was, however, a more socialist side to Bachynskyi's argument. He believed that the revolution had created bourgeois capitalist states in Russia and the Ukraine, which in the past he had described as being the precursors to the introduction

of socialism. He also welcomed the appearance of proletarian culture, claiming that this was the next step in human development.

However, in the 1930s it became very difficult to support the Soviet Ukraine in the belief that it benefited the cultural and state interests of the Ukrainian nation. Sovietophiles, like Krushelnytskyi, who continued to defend the Soviet Ukraine in this period used rhetoric of a very different kind. Krushelnytskyi's arguments in favour of the Soviet Ukraine were much more grounded in socialist thought than those put forward by Lozynskyi. Though he praised the Bolsheviks' supposed cultural achievements in the Ukraine, Krushelnytskyi understood the good of his people to be promoted primarily by industrialisation and the socialisation of agriculture. Unlike Bachynskyi or Lozynskyi, he was not interested in the constitutional relationship between the Soviet Ukrainian and Russian republics. Whereas Lozynkyi had spoken of the popular masses, Krushelnytskyi talked of the industrial and agricultural proletariat. Krushelnytskyi was also far more bitter in his attacks on Western democracy than either Bachynskyi or Lozynskyi. Above all, Krushelnytskyi refused to question the purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and KP(b)U, accepting the Soviet line that these people were traitors who had intended harm to the Soviet Union. By this stage, unquestioning faith was the prerequisite for a Sovietophile orientation.

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